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The creation of a third-party-beneficiary interest is a method to police the actions of entities
doing business abroad. This Note discusses the viability of gleaning from the Principles a third-
party-beneficiary right for project-affected communities to ensure compliance with the Industry’s
social and environmental standards. Part I defines project finance, discusses the emergence of so-
cial and environmental standards, such as the Principles, and describes the requirements of each
of the ten individual Principles. Part II provides real world examples of the lack of effectiveness
of the Principles in practice and explains some of the forces contributing to this practical fail-
ure. Part II also provides an overview of third-party-beneficiary rights in US law, describes three
relevant cases involving third-party-beneficiary rights, and explains barriers to enforcement of a
third-party- beneficiary claim. Finally, Part III analyzes the viability of enforcing compliance with
the Principles through third-party- beneficiary rights under US contract law.
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The recent emergence of social and environmental
standards in the project finance industry ("Industry") has
changed the way most major international financial institutions
("IFIs") approach project finance.' Project finance is a method
of financing often used to create large infrastructure projects, in
which the borrower is a company specially formed for the
creation of the infrastructure facility and the lender is repaid
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1. See Paul Watchman, Banks, Business and Human Rights, 2 BUTTERWORTHSJ. INT'L
BANKING & FIN. L. 46, 46 (2006) ("Global banks and international businesses have now
reached a tipping point on environmental, social and human rights issues whereby we
can now characterise 21st century international business as being at the dawn of a New
Enlightenment based on responsible banking.. . ."); see also Kevin Godier, The Changing
View of Governance, in SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT 24 (2004) (quoting an International
Finance Corporation ("IFC") senior advisor stating that the Equator Principles
("Principles") are "the market standard for new project finance business"); About the
Equator Principles, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/AbouttheEquatorPrinciples.pdf (last visited Jan. 5, 2011)
(describing the Principles as the "gold standard" for sustainable project finance and a
"huge step forward for the industry"). See generally Ryan Hansen, The Impact of the
Equator Principles on Lender Liability: Risks of Responsible Lending (unpublished
LL.M dissertation, London Sch. of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Nov. 2006), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=948228 (detailing the effect on
lenders of greater responsibility for sustainable practices).
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primarily from the cash flow and value of the facility itself.2 The
major lenders are IFIs, such as the World Bank and large private
commercial banks.3 As a result of public outcry against the
negative impacts of projects around the globe,4 IFIs have created
social and environmental standards by which the projects they
fund must be governed.5 The Equator Principles ("Principles")
are a set of voluntary guidelines adopted by private commercial
banks to ensure sustainable social and environmental practices as
a condition to obtaining funding for project finance deals.6
Even for projects that promise to abide by these standards,
however, noncompliance continues7 as investors try to maximize
profit and shirk their contractual responsibilities in project-
2. See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, THE "EQUATOR PRINCIPLES": A FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
BENCHMARK FOR DETERMINING, ASSESSING, AND MANAGING SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK IN PROJECT FINANCING (2006), available at http://www.equator-principles.com/
documents/EquatorPrinciples.pdf [hereinafter THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES] (defining
project finance as "a method of funding in which the lender looks primarily to the
revenues generated by a single project both as the source of repayment and as security
for the exposure, plays an important role in financing development throughout the
world"). See generally SCOTr L. HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNATIONAL
PROJECT FINANCE (2008) (explaining project finance).
3. David B. Hunter, Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental
Standards at International Financial Institutions, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 437, 437-51 (2008)
(listing sources of international project finance capital as multilateral development
banks, such as the World Bank and the IFC, export credit agencies ("ECAs"), and
private commercial banks).
4. See Kirk Herbertson & David Hunter, Emerging Standards for Sustainable Finance of
the Energy Sector, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 4, 5 (2007) (explaining that
international financial institutions ("IFIs") were supporting "some of the most
environmentally damaging projects taking place in developing countries"); see also
Robert F. Lawrence & William L. Thomas, The Equator Principles and Project Finance:
Sustainability in Practice?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 2004, at 20 (2006) ("The
environmental and social impacts of such projects are sometimes highly
controversial . . .).
5. See Herbertson & Hunter, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that IFIs adopted social
and environmental policies as a result of pressure from civil society groups); see also
Hunter, supra note 3, at 437-51 (explaining the emergence of social and environmental
standards among project finance lending institutions).
6. See About the Equator Principles, supra note 1 (defining the Principles as "a
voluntary set of standards for determining, assessing and managing social and
environmental risk in project financing"); see also Andrew Hardenbrook, The Equator
Principles: The Private Financial Sector's Attempt at Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 197, 200-01 (2007) (describing the purpose of the Principles).
7. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 207-10 (describing various criticisms of the
Principles); see, e.g., Nick Mathiason, Banks Attacked for Failures to Meet Equator Principles
on Environment, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 15, 2010, at 38. ("The world's biggest banks
are continuing to lend money to some of the most environmentally damaging energy
and infrastructure projects despite a supposed groundbreaking protocol . . . .").
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affected areas.8 Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the
communities affected by these projects often lack access to
remedies.9 In other contexts, such as racial equality,'0 fair
housing," and shareholder rights,'2 US courts have allowed
nonparties to enforce a contract under a third-party-beneficiary
theory in US contract law.13 Because international project finance
contracts are often governed by US law,' 4 recognition of a third-
8. See, e.g., Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 22 (arguing that imposing the
Principles is not always in the lender's interest because "[r]equiring such compliance
would increase the operating costs of the project, and reduce the project's financial
viability"); see also Alan Clendenning, Brazil's Amazon Building Boom Draws Protests,
MSNBC, May 23, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24794759 (discussing the
tension between indigenous communities and the eagerness of project finance investors
on the Madeira River).
9. See Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap:
Toward a New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 187,
207 (2008) ("[L]ocally-affected communities have little effective access to justice under
international law."); see also Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, 1 3, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) ("[G]overnance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without adequate
sanctioning or reparation.").
10. See, e.g., Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 1967)
(finding African-American school children to be third-party beneficiaries of a contract
between the school board and the federal government); Macedonia Church v. Lancaster
Hotel Ltd., 2010 WL 3925199, at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2010) (finding members of an
African-American congregation to be third-party beneficiaries of a contract between
their church and a hotel that failed to provide them with adequate accommodations).
11. See, e.g., Zigas v. Superior Ct., 120 Cal. App. 3d 827, 834 (1981) (finding
housing tenants to be third-party beneficiaries of a contract between a developer and a
federal government agency); Holbrook v. Pitt, 643 F.2d 1261, 1265 (Wis. 1981) (finding
housing project tenants to be third-party beneficiaries of a contract between a federal
government agency and a housing project owner).
12. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 292 B.R. 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
shareholders in a bankruptcy proceeding to be third-party beneficiaries of a merger
agreement); Weinberger v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 335 F. Supp. 139, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(finding an investor to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the New York
Stock Exchange and the Securities and Exchange Commission).
13. See Prouty v. Gores Tech. Grp., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1232 (2004) (granting
third-party beneficiary status to former employees pursuant to a merger); Chen v. St.
Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (granting third-party
beneficiary status in the employment context).
14. See Pandora D. Strasler, Practical Considerations in Negotiating International Credit
Facilities, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 335, 338 (2002) ("Many international credit
transactions apply New York law to the credit agreement ... even if the borrower and
lender have little connection to New York."); see also Charlotte Ku & Christopher J.
Borgen, American Lawyers and International Competence, 18 DICK. J. INT'L L. 493, 514
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party-beneficiary right may provide a remedy for project-affected
communities. Recognition of such a right to enforce compliance
with social and environmental standards would change the
project finance landscape, as borrowers are challenged to keep
their contractual commitments.15
The creation of a third-party-beneficiary interest is a method
to police the actions of entities doing business abroad.16 This
Note discusses the viability of gleaning from the Principles a
third-party-beneficiary right for project-affected communities to
ensure compliance with the Industry's social and environmental
standards. Part I defines project finance, discusses the emergence
of social and environmental standards, such as the Principles,
and describes the requirements of each of the ten individual
Principles. Part II provides real world examples of the lack of
effectiveness of the Principles in practice and explains some of
the forces contributing to this practical failure. Part II also
provides an overview of third-party-beneficiary rights in US law,
describes three relevant cases involving third-party-beneficiary
rights, and explains barriers to enforcement of a third-party-
beneficiary claim. Finally, Part III analyzes the viability of
enforcing compliance with the Principles through third-party-
beneficiary rights under US contract law.
(stating that historically New York law is a common choice of law and the Southern
District of New York is a common forum for international loan documentation).
15. See Roger P. Alford, Arbitrating Human Rights, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 540-
41 (2008) (suggesting that a third-party-beneficiary right would increase the ability to
monitor abuses); see also WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, SHAPING THE FUTURE OF SUSTAINABLE
FINANCE: MOVING FROM PAPER PROMISES To PERFORMANCE 79 (2006) ("[A]ffected
people should be able to bring third-party complaints regarding the behaviour of either
the bank or its clients under the dispute resolution procedures of the financial
agreement."); Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A
Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159, 174-81 (2006)
(espousing the use of the "citizen suit" to increase enforcement).
16. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 15, at 541 ("[C]orporations can grant to a narrow
category of constituents third-party beneficiary rights to address human rights
concerns... ."); Wendy N. Duong, Partnerships with Monarchs-Two Case Studies: Case
Two Partnerships with Monarchs in the Development of Energy Resources: Dissecting an
Independent Power Project and Re-Evaluating the Role of Multilateral and Project Financing in
the International Energy Sector, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 136-37 (2005) ("[T]he
people of the 'Third World' should be regarded as 'third-party beneficiaries' of
[corporations'] partnerships with governments.") (emphasis omitted); Lakhani, supra
note 15, at 178 (explaining that creation of a third-party-beneficiary interest would
improve compliance with environmental laws).
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I. THE PRINCIPLES AS ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL
STANDARDS
The Principles are a set of guidelines that govern the social
and environmental practices of project finance deals that obtain
funding from private commercial banks. Before delving into the
details of the Principles, Part I provides a brief overview of
project finance and explains recent changes in the Industry
toward promoting sustainable practices. Section A defines project
finance, identifies the major lenders, and discusses the governing
law that typically applies to loan documentation. Section B
discusses the social and environmental policies in the Industry,
including the emergence of the Principles as an Industry
framework. Finally, Section C explains each of the ten individual
principles in detail.
A. Wat is Project Finance?
Project finance is a method of funding typically used to
finance large infrastructure projects built for purposes such as
power generation, chemical production, mining,
telecommunication, and transportation.17 The major project
finance lenders include multilateral development banks, such as
the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation
("IFC"), 18 export credit agencies ("ECAs"), 19 and private
17. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2005), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf [hereinafter BASEL COMMITTEE] ("Project
finance is usually for large, complex and expensive installations that might include, for
example, power plants, chemical processing plants, mines, transportation infrastructure,
environment, and telecommunications infrastructure."); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 2,
at 4.
18. The IFC is an affiliate of the World Bank that invests in the private sector. See
Carol M. Mates, Project Finance in Emerging Markets-The Role of the International Finance
Corporation, 18 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 165, 165 (2004); see also Margaret B. Cole, Project
Financing: An International Finance Corporation Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL RESOURCES
LAw II: A BLUEPRINT FOR MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ch. 8C (1995) ("IFC's fundamental
role is to promote economic development by encouraging private sector investment
activities in developing countries.").
19. ECAs are public agencies that provide loans, insurance, and guarantees to
corporations doing business abroad. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 445-46; see also
HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 451 (defining ECAs as "credit facilities or guarantee
programs made available by a country for the benefit of exporters of goods or services in
that country, in an effort to promote exports").
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commercial banks.20 Because these infrastructure projects are
capital intensive and often high risk,21 a project sponsor22
generally forms a special purpose entity, which serves as both the
project company and borrower.23 The project company is
responsible for creating, owning, and maintaining the
infrastructure facility, as well as obtaining the capital to finance
it.24 In turn, the lender has recourse primarily against the project
company, with repayment dependent on the cash flow, assets,
and value of the project itself, rather than on the resources of the
project sponsor.25
Due to the nature of such projects, large amounts of
investment are subject to high risk of loss, particularly in
emerging markets. 26 For example, because projects operate
under the authority of host governments, a major concern is
expropriation risk, in which a government nationalizes or takes
ownership of a project without providing just compensation to
20. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 437-38; see also Herbertson & Hunter, supra note 4,
at 5 (listing the major IFIs in project finance as the World Bank Group, other
multilateral development banks, ECAs, and private commercial banks).
21. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 7, 27-28. For a discussion of risk specific to
emerging markets, see id. at 18; see also Duong, supra note 16, at 69, 81 (explaining that
project finance is used in capital-intensive projects with multiple sources of risk).
22. The project sponsor is the entity that initiates the project and owns, at least in
part, the project company. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 452; see also ETHICAL
INVESTMENT RESEARCH SERVICES, PROJECT FINANCE: A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE? 3 (2006)
("Project sponsors usually contribute the equity and 'own' the project. . . .").
23. See BASEL COMMITTEE, supra note 17, at 49 ("The borrower is usually an SPE
(Special Purpose Entity) that is not permitted to perform any function other than
developing, owning, and operating the installation."); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at
87, 452 (defining "project company" as "a special-purpose entity that develops, owns,
and operates a project" and citing the "single-purpose corporate subsidiary" as the most
common structure for project financing).
24. See sources cited supra note 23; see also HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 87
(explaining that the project company's sole purpose is to "develop, construct, own,
operate, and maintain a particular project").
25. There are two common types of financing: limited recourse and nonrecourse
financing. In nonrecourse financing, repayment to the lender is entirely dependent on
the value and earnings of the facility, effectively shielding the sponsor from any
repayment obligation of the project company. In limited recourse financing, which is
more typical, the sponsor has some obligation to repay, which will be determined based
on the specific risks associated with the facility. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 4-5; see also
Duong, supra note 16, at 76-77.
26. See Duong, supra note 16, at 97-101 (discussing special considerations for
project finance in developing countries); see also HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 7, 27-28
(discussing the various risks associated with project finance). For a discussion of risk
specific to emerging markets, see HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 18.
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the project developers.27 Additional sources of risk include
currency devaluation resulting from fluctuations in the market;
political turmoil associated with transfers of power in the host
state; and civil unrest or war in the region.28 To insulate lenders
from bearing these risks, the law governing project finance loan
documentation is often the law of a jurisdiction with an
established commercial law and legal system.20 For this reason,
loan documentation is commonly governed by New York state
law and designates New York as the forum for handling disputes
between the parties to the contract.30 New York law allows any
person to bring a breach of contract action against an out-of-state
corporation provided that the contract is governed by New York
law and involves an amount of money greater than one million
US dollars, and that the corporation submits to the jurisdiction
of New York courts.3 1 In addition, it is common for lenders to
27. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 48-49 (describing expropriation risk as
"[n]ationalization by the host country of project assets or rights, or the equity ownership
of the project, in an arbitrary, discriminatory way, or without just compensation"); see
also Duong, supra note 16, at 81-82 (discussing measures for avoiding expropriation risk
in project financing).
28. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 44, 51-52 (discussing currency risks, political
collapse and succession, and "political force majeure events"); see also Harold F. Moore,
Allocating Foreseeable Sovereign Risks in Infrastructure Investment in Indonesia: Force Majeure
and Indonesia's Economic Woes, 822 P.L.I. COM. L. & PRAC. HANDBOOK SERIES, 463, 471
(2001) ("[I]nfrastructure projects in developing countries remain subject to sovereign
credit risks, sovereign currency fluctuations, resulting difficulties emerging from
fundamental mismatch between project liabilities denominated in hard currency and
revenues denominated in local currency, and sovereign political risks.").
29. See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 356 (stating that the laws of ajurisdiction with "a
developed commercial law, case law precedents and experienced judges" will govern
credit documents); see also Strasler, supra note 14, at 338 (selection of New York law
driven by existence of a "well defined, independent, and sufficiently developed legal
system").
30. See Strasler, supra note 14, at 338 ("Many international credit transactions apply
New York law to the credit agreement ... even if the borrower and lender have little
connection to New York."); see also Ku & Borgen, supra note 14, at 514 ("The laws of the
State of New York have historically been a common choice of law for international loan
documents and-if the dispute is settled before a court as opposed to through
arbitration-the federal courts, especially the Southern District of New York, are often
the forum of choice."). California law might also be chosen as governing law. See Darryl
D. Chiang, Foreign Lawyer Provisions in Hong Kong and the Republic of China on Taiwan, 13
UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 306, 307 n.3 (1995) (explaining that California law is a common
choice for international commercial contracts).
31. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 5-1402(1) (McKinney 2010) ("[A]ny person may
maintain an action ... against a foreign corporation ... where the action ... arises out
of or relates to any contract ... for which a choice of New York law has been made in
whole or in part ... and which (a) is a contract .. . relating to any obligation arising out
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require borrowers to waive their rights to any jurisdictional
objections that could arise in the course of litigation, such as
forum non conveniens.32
B. The Rise of the Principles as an Industry Framework
The Principles emerged as an Industry standard for private
commercial banks in 2003, only after other lending institutions
in the Industry had established best practices for sustainability.33
The need for social and environmental standards began in the
1980s when the World Bank faced significant public outcry
against its funding of certain controversial projects. 34 As a result,
the World Bank created a set of "safeguard policies" aimed at
of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less than one million dollars, and (b)
which contains a provision ... whereby such foreign corporation agrees to submit to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state."); see also Kimmo MettAlk, Governing-Law Clauses of
Loan Agreements in International Project Financing, 20 INT'L LAW. 219, 239 (1986) (noting
that "it is not entirely clear" how forum non conveniens would apply in New York courts,
but discussing New York General Obligations Law section 5-1402(1)); Beatie & Osborn
LLP v. Patriot Scientific Corp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 367, 390 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating
that New York General Obligations Law section 5-1402 is "a statutory mandate that a
clause designating New York as the forum shall be enforceable ... regardless of any
inconvenience to the parties" (citing Int'l Medical Tech., Inc. v. Lintech, LLC 2000 WL
1449889 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Worley, 690 N.Y.S.2d 57,
59 (1st Dept. 1999))).
32. See Carl S. Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected Issues under
Revised Article 9, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 268 (1999) ("Not only do the documents most
often choose New York or other U.S. law in their governing law clauses; they also require
the project company and other non-U.S. parties to submit to the jurisdiction of U.S.
state and federal courts, to appoint a U.S. agent for service of process, and to waive
jurisdictional objections such as forum non conveniens and sovereign immunity under
the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act."); see also Philip Le B. Douglas, Resolving
Project Disputes, 734 P.L.I. COM. HANDBOOK SERIES, 47, 79 (1996) (stating that in project
financings, "parties may wish to waive the defense of forum non conveniens").
33. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 437-51 (explaining that public pressure led the
World Bank to create social and environmental standards that spurred other IFIs to
follow suit); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that the Principles arose from
"sustained external and internal pressure").
34. These included the Sardar Sarovar dam in India and the Polonoreste highway
in Brazil. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 438-39 ("Projects such as the Sardar Sarovar dam
in India's Narmada Valley and the Polonoroeste highway in the Brazilian Amazon led to
worldwide civil society opposition, because they were designed with limited concern for
impacts on local communities and the environment."); see, e.g., Komala Ramachandra,
Sardar Sarovar: An Experience Retained?, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 275, 276-77 (2006)
(explaining that the World Bank was criticized for serious environmental and human
rights abuses); Philip Shabecoff, World Bank Offers Environmental Projects, N.Y. TIMES, May
6, 1987, at A14 (stating that the World Bank introduced new policies after "a road
project in the Amazon that critics said led to the destruction of tropical forests").
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ensuring sustainable practices for large, public sector
infrastructure projects. 35 These policies require borrower
compliance with a number of items before funding is approved,36
including the performance of a social and environmental
assessment and the formulation of a plan to mitigate damage to
the local community and environment.37 Other multilateral
development banks, such as the Asian Development Bank, the
Inter-American Development Bank, and the African
Development Bank, follow the World Bank's policies.38
In 1997, a controversy involving the hydroelectric Pangue
Dam39 project caused the IFC, the World Bank's private sector
lending institution, to adopt its own set of standards to ensure
35. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 438 (explaining the purpose and origin of the
World Bank's social and environmental policies); Operation Manual: Table Al-
Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies-Policy Objectives and Operational Principles,
WORLD BANK (July 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/OPSMANUAL/
Resources/EntireOM External.pdf [hereinafter The World Bank Social Safeguard
Policies] (outlining the safeguard policies).
36. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 439 (stating that projects must be assessed for their
social and environmental impacts before projects will be financed by the World Bank);
Operation Manual: OP 4.0-Environmental Assessment, WORLD BANK (Jan. 1999),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/OPSMANUAL/Resources/EntireOMExternal.pdf
("The Bank requires environmental assessment (EA) of projects proposed for Bank
financing to help ensure that they are environmentally sound and sustainable. . . .").
37. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 440-42 (summarizing the World Bank safeguard
policies); The World Bank Social Safeguard Policies, supra note 35 (outlining the
safeguard policies).
38. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 442 ("Regional development banks, such as the
Asian Development Bank ... the Inter-American Development Bank . .. and the African
Development Bank . .. largely copy the policies of the World Bank."); see also
Herbertson & Hunter, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that multilateral development banks
such as the African Development Bank and Inter-American Development Bank all follow
the World Bank's standards).
39. The Pangue Dam is a hydroelectric power facility that was constructed over the
Bfo-Bfo river in Chile between 1993 and 1997. Despite mass protests by the local
community and both national and international non-governmental organizations
("NGOs"), the IFC continued with its US$150 million financing of the project. The
project resulted in, among other things, the forced eviction of members of the
indigenous community and a failure to provide adequate resettlement assistance. The
IFC eventually withdrew its support of the project, but the host government obtained
funding elsewhere. See Barbara Rose Johnston & Carmen Garcia-Downing, Hydroelectric
Development on the Bio-Bio River, Chile: Anthropology and Human Rights Advocacy, in IN THE
WAY OF DEvELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, LIFE PROJECTS AND GLOBALIZATION 211-
34 (Mario Blaser et al. eds., 2004). See generally The Bio-Bio River Case, Chile, AM. UNIV.,
http://wwwl.american.edu/ted/ice/chiledam.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (detailing
the case background and social and environmental impacts of the Bio-Bfo River
project).
2011] THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 461
the sustainability of IFC-funded projects.40 The IFC's Policy on
Social and Environmental Sustainability identifies the obligations
of the IFC in conducting project review, while the IFC
Performance Standards consist of eight requirements with which
the borrower must comply. 41 This framework would later serve as
the basis for the Principles.42
ECAs, which provide the largest amount of public funding
for investment in developing nations,43 followed suit after their
involvement in projects such as China's Three Gorges Dam,
which displaced a reported 1.13 million people." Between 2001
and 2007, member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ("OECD") created the Common
Approaches on the Environment and Officially Supported
Export Credits ("Common Approaches"). 4 5 The Common
Approaches require ECAs to monitor the environmental impacts
40. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 443-44 ("[I]n response to controversy around the
Pangue Dam in Chile, the IFC was forced to announce publicly that it would henceforth
follow the environmental and social policies of its sister organizations at the World Bank
Group."); see also IFC, LESSONS LEARNED: PANGUE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT 2 (2008)
("[lIt was the Pangue project that catalyzed the strengthening of IFC's institutional
capacity to address environmental and social issues.").
41. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 444 (explaining the two-tiered approach of the
IFC's social and environmental policies). See generally IFC, POLICY ON SOCIAL &
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2006) (stating the IFC's Policy on Social and
Environmental Sustainability and the eight Performance Standards for borrowers).
42. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 445 (stating that the IFC policies are "largely
incorporated" in the Principles); Jose Antonio Urrutia, The Equator Principles or How the
Way to Do Business Has Changed, 54 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST., § 16.03 (2008) (discussing
the IFC as the origin of the movement to create the Principles).
43. ECAs are national government agencies that provide loans, insurance, and
guarantees to home country corporations to do business abroad. See Hunter, supra note
3, at 445-46 (explaining ECAs). In 1998, the United States was the only country with
ECAs that had written environmental policies. See id.; see also U.S. GOV'T AccOUNTING
OFFICE, EXPORT CREDIT AGENCIES: MOVEMENT TOWARD COMMON ENVIRONMENTAL
GUIDELINES, BUT NATIONAL DIFFERENCES REMAIN 1 (2003) ("ECAs annually finance
around $60 billion in exports each year for medium- and long-term projects. . . .").
44. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 446 (explaining that ECA funding of controversial
projects such as China's Three Gorges Dam lead ECAs to develop a set of social and
environmental standards); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 8
(explaining that pressure for ECA standards arose "as a result of actual or proposed ECA
funding of large potentially environmentally harmful projects as the Three Gorges Dam
in China. . . ."); Jim Yardley, At China's Dams, Problems Rise with Water, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2007, at Al (citing "the project's official tally of 1.13 million displaced people").
45. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 447-48 (describing the evolution of the Common
Approaches on the Environment and Officially Supported Export Credits ("Common
Approaches")); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43 (outlining the
progression of ECAs' adoption of social and environmental standards).
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of ECA-funded projects, albeit to a lesser degree than under the
World Bank standards.46
Once ECAs began to establish social and environmental
standards, the only remaining project finance lenders without
such standards were private commercial banks.47 In 2002, the IFC
and nine other banks met to discuss these recent Industry
developments. 48 As a result of this meeting, four private
commercial banks created a set of global standards, known as the
Equator Principles, to be voluntarily adopted by private banks
involved in project finance.49 In 2003, ten private banks publicly
announced that they would adhere to the Principles.50 By 2006,
the Principles had been adopted by forty IFIs, comprising eighty
percent of all lending for project finance deals.5' IFIs that
subscribe to the Principles, known as the Equator Principles
Financial Institutions ("EPFIs"),52 explicitly state that they will
46. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 449 ("Although progress has been substantial, most
ECA policies still do not meet the environmental and social standards of the World Bank
and other MDBs."); see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 43, at 11-15
(explaining differences in the World Bank standards and those applying to ECAs).
47. See Hunter, supra note 3, at 450 (" [T]he primary remaining sources of project
finance lacking environmental standards were private commercial banks.").
48. See About the Equator Principles, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that in October 2002
nine international banks met in London with the IFC); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 4
("[A] small number of influential banks gathered ... and ... agreed to develop a
framework for handling the environmental and social risks. . . .").
49. See About the Equator Principles, supra note 1, at 4 ("Four of the banks
present. . . , acknowledging the general consensus amongst those present, volunteered
jointly to develop a banking industry framework for addressing environmental and social
risks in project financing that could be applied globally and across all industry sectors.").
The four private commercial banks were ABN Anro, Barclays, Citi, and WestLB. Id.
50. See About the Equator Principles, supra note 1, at 4 (naming the ten banks that
adopted the Principles); see also Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 199 (describing that ten
private banks adopted the Principles on June 4, 2003). A revised set of Principles, which
took into account issues raised by the public, was promulgated in 2006. See
Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 199-200 (discussing the 2006 version of the Principles).
51. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 199 (stating that forty IFIs had adopted the
Principles by its third anniversary, amounting to eighty percent of all project lending);
see also ETHICAL INVESTMENT RESEARCH SERVICES, supra note 22, at 2 (explaining that
the Principles were adopted by eighty percent of IFIs in project finance by 2006). As of
the date of this writing, sixty-eight IFIs have adopted the Principles. See About the Equator
Principles, supra note 1, at 13.
52. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 199 (referring to private institutions that
subscribe to the Principles as Equator Principles Financial Institutions ("EPFIs")); see
also About the Equator Principles, supra note 1, at 1 (same).
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not lend to projects in which a borrower cannot, or will not,
adhere to the Principles' social and environmental policies.53
C. The Principles in Detail
According to the preamble, the purpose of the Principles is
to ensure that EPFI-funded projects are performed in a way that
is socially and environmentally sound54 and avoids negative
impacts on local communities.55 The preamble states, "We
believe that adoption of and adherence to these Principles offers
significant benefits to ourselves, our borrowers and local stakeholders
through our borrowers' engagement with locally affected
communities."5 6 An "affected community" is the local population
within the project's "area of influence" that likely will be
negatively impacted by the project.5 7
In order for a project to obtain funding from an EPFI, the
project must conform to the Principles. 8 Under Principle 1,
EPFIs must categorize each project according to IFC standards by
the potential impacts and risks on the local environment and
community.59 Category A projects have substantial negative
impacts on the local community, while Category B projects have
53. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1 ("We will not provide
loans to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with our respective
social and environmental policies and procedures that implement the Equator
Principles."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 5 (citing the Preamble to the Principles).
54. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1 (" [EPFIs] have . . . adopted
these Principles in order to ensure that the projects we finance are developed in a
manner that is socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management
practices."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 5-6 (discussing the pros and cons of this
flexible standard).
55. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1("[N]egative impacts on
project-affected ecosystems and communities should be avoided where possible, and if
these impacts are unavoidable, they should be reduced, mitigated and/or compensated
for appropriately.").
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 4 n.4 (defining "affected community" as "communities of the local
population within the project's area of influence who are likely to be adversely affected
by the project").
58. See id. at 2-3 ("EPFIs will only provide loans to projects that conform to
Principles 1-9"; Principle 10 concerns the responsibilities of the EPFI).
59. See id. princ. 1, at 2 ("When a project is proposed for financing, the EPFI will,
as part of its internal social and environmental review and due diligence, categorise such
project based on the magnitude of its potential impacts and risks in accordance with the
environmental and social screening criteria of the [IFC."); see also Hansen, supra note 1,
at 9-10 (discussing categorization of projects by EPFIs under Principle 1).
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more limited social or environmental consequences. 60 Projects in
Category C have little or no social or environmental effects. 6'
High-impact projects, those in Category A or B, must conduct
and submit an assessment of these impacts and risks
("Assessment"), including labor, health, and safety concerns. 62
The Assessment should also propose methods to alleviate and
control these impacts and risks.63 In addition, projects must
create an action plan ("Action Plan") and management system,
which prioritize the steps required to mitigate, monitor, and
rectify the impacts and risks in accordance with host country laws
and the IFC Performance Standards. 64
60. The categorization of projects is detailed in Exhibit I of the Principles. THE
EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, Exhibit I, at 6. EPFIs categorize each project based
on the project's estimated impacts on the local community. Id. (defining a Category A
project as having "significant adverse social or environmental impacts that are diverse,
irreversible or unprecedented" and a Category B project as having limited effects that
are "few in number, generally site-specific, largely reversible and readily addressed
through mitigation measures"); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing
categorization of projects by EPFIs under Principle 1); Lawrence & Thomas, supra note
4, at 20 (stating that most major, new projects would fall under Category A).
61. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, Exhibit I, at 6 (defining a Category
C project as having little or no social or environmental effects); see also Hansen, supra
note 1, at 9 (discussing the categorization of projects).
62. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 2 n.2 (defining the Social and
Environmental Assessment ("Assessment") as a "process that determines the social and
environmental impacts and risks (including labour, health, and safety) of a proposed
project in its area of influence"). Examples of the items that should be included in the
Assessment are provided in Exhibit II to the Principles. Id. at 7, Exhibit II; see also
Hansen, supra note 1, at 11-12 (discussing the Assessment).
63. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 2, at 2 ("For each project
assessed as being either Category A or Category B, the borrower has conducted a Social
and Environmental Assessment ... to address, as appropriate and to the EPFI's
satisfaction, the relevant social and environmental impacts and risks of the proposed
project.. . . The Assessment should also propose mitigation and management measures
relevant and appropriate to the nature and scale of the proposed project.").
64. See id. princ. 4, at 3 ("The [Action Plan) will describe and prioritise the actions
needed to implement mitigation measures, corrective actions and monitoring measures
necessary to manage the impacts and risks identified in the Assessment. Borrowers will
build on, maintain or establish a Social and Environmental Management System that
addresses the management of these impacts, risks, and corrective actions required to
comply with applicable host country social and environmental laws and regulations, and
requirements of the applicable [IFC] Performance Standards and [Industry-Specific
Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS)] Guidelines.. . ."); see also Hansen, supra note
1, at 13 (discussing the Action Plan). The IFC Performance Standards are included as
Exhibit III to the Principles. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, Exhibit Ill, at 8.
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Principles 5 and 6 address communication with affected
communities.65 A project that is expected to have significant
negative impacts must demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the
EPFI, that it has sufficiently taken into account the concerns of
the community.66 To do so, the project must establish "free, prior
and informed"67 consultation and involvement with the
community.68 Throughout the construction and operation of the
project, a grievance mechanism must be accessible to project-
affected communities as a forum in which to raise their
concerns.69 The mechanism must be able to resolve issues
65. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princs. 5, 6, at 3-4 (establishing the
requirements for "[c]onsulation and [d]isclosure" with the project-affected community
and the creation of a "[g]rievance [m]echanism"); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 13-
14 (discussing consultation and grievance mechanisms).
66. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 5, at 3 (" [T]he government,
borrower or third party expert has consulted with project affected communities in a
structured and culturally appropriate manner."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 13
(discussing Principle 5).
67. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 5, at 3 (defining "free, prior and
informed" as follows: "free" means "free of external manipulation, interference or
coercion, and intimidation"; "prior" means the disclosure of information about the
project must be timely; "informed" means the consultation and participation is
"relevant, understandable and [provides] accessible information"); see also Hansen,
supra note 1, at 13-14 (discussing adequate consultation). The Principles specify that
these parameters apply not only to the initial aspects of the project but also to the entire
project, from start to finish. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 3 n.5,
(establishing that the consultation requirement should "apply to the entire project
process and not to the early stages of the project alone"). In addition, projects affecting
the rights of indigenous peoples must meet a more rigorous set of requirements. Id.
("Consultation with Indigenous Peoples must conform to specific and detailed
requirements as found in [IFC] Performance Standard 7. Furthermore, the special
rights of Indigenous Peoples as recognised by host-country legislation will need to be
addressed.").
68. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 5, at 3 ("For projects with
significant adverse impacts on affected communities, the process will ensure their free,
prior and informed consultation and facilitate their informed participation as a means
to establish, to the satisfaction of the EPFI, whether a project has adequately
incorporated affected communities' concerns."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 13-14
(discussing Principle 5).
69. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 6, at 4 ("[T]o ensure that
consultation, disclosure and community engagement continues throughout
construction and operation of the project, the borrower will, scaled to the risks and
adverse impacts of the project, establish a grievance mechanism as part of the
management system. This will allow the borrower to receive and facilitate resolution of
concerns and grievances about the project's social and environmental performance
raised by individuals or groups from among project-affected communities. The borrower
will inform the affected communities about the mechanism in the course of its
community engagement process and ensure that the mechanism addresses concerns
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expeditiously, transparently, and in accordance with the local
culture.70
Independent experts must be appointed to monitor
compliance under Principles 7 and 9.71 EPFIs will require
independent monitoring and reporting of the borrower's
compliance for the life of the loan.72 Thus, borrowers must either
appoint independent experts or retain appropriate external
experts to monitor their projects. 3
In Principle 8, the Principles create formal contractual
obligations, rather than solely voluntary guidelines.74 Principle 8
requires Category A borrowers and Category B borrowers to
covenant to the following items in their financing documents.75
Borrowers must promise to comply with all relevant host country
laws, as well as their Action Plans for the duration of the project's
construction and operation.76 Borrowers must also promise to
promptly and transparently, in a culturally appropriate manner, and is readily accessible
to all segments of the affected communities.").
70. See id. (discussing the grievance mechanism); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at
14 (same).
71. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princs. 7, 9, at 4-5 (requiring
independent review and monitoring); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 14 (explaining
that the purpose of Principles 7, 8, and 9 is "to secure objectivity and accountability
throughout the life of the project").
72. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 9, at 5 (requiring the
"appointment of an independent environmental and/or social expert, or requir[ing]
that the borrower retain qualified and experienced external experts to verify its
monitoring information which would be shared with EPFIs."); see also Hansen, supra
note 1, at 14-15 (discussing the independent review required by Principles 7 and 9).
73. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 9, at 5; see also Hansen, supra
note 1, at 14-15 (stating that EPFI's "sign off" on the borrower's compliance leading to
potential liability on the part of EPFIs).
74. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (requiring borrowers
to make covenants in loan documentation); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 16-17
("Principle 8 is perhaps the most important of all the Principles; it maximizes EPFI
influence over a project by requiring borrowers to comply with the Principles or face
possible default and EPFIs' enforcement of remedial rights under the loan
agreement.").
75. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (requiring borrowers
to covenant to four items in loan documentation); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 16-17
(discussing Principle 8).
76. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (stating that
borrowers must covenant to "comply with all relevant host country social and
environmental laws, regulations and permits in all material respects" and "comply with
the [Action Plan] (where applicable) during the construction and operation of the
project in all material respects"); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 16-17 (restating and
discussing Principle 8).
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provide documentation of their compliance."7 Finally, borrowers
must promise to decommission facilities in accordance with an
agreed plan.7 8
EPFIs also have responsibilities under the Principles,79 which
has led some authors to consider whether banks may be liable for
failing to abide by them.80 Under Principle 8, should a borrower
fail to uphold the above covenants, the EPFI will assist the
borrower to achieve compliance for an agreed grace period.8' If,
after this period, the borrower still fails to comply, the EPFI may
exercise remedies against the borrower.82 In addition, EPFIs must
release reports of their projects to the public at least once a year
77. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (stating that
borrowers must covenant to "provide periodic reports ... that i) document compliance
with the [Action Plan] (where applicable), and ii) provide representation of compliance
with relevant local, state and host country social and environmental laws, regulations
and permits); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 16 (discussing Principle 8).
78. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (stating that
borrowers must covenant to "decommission the facilities, where applicable and
appropriate, in accordance with an agreed decommissioning plan"); see also Lawrence &
Thomas, supra note 4, at 25 (discussing the decommissioning of facilities and noting
that this requirement is not typical of most loan agreements).
79. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princs. 8-10, at 4-5 (defining the
responsibilities of EPFIs); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 19-20 ("By adopting ... the
Principles, EPFIs agree to shoulder responsibility for assessing and monitoring a
borrower's social and environmental activities.").
80. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1, at 1 ("By adopting more responsible lending
practices ... lenders increase their control over project activities, potentially exposing
themselves to greater liability risks."); Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 25-26
(discussing the Principles' ambiguity regarding the EPFIs' roles and the expectation that
NGOs will seek new ways to hold EPFIs to their commitments); Paul Q. Watchman,
Banking on Responsibility, SL098 ALI-ABA 385, 392 (2006) (stating that EPFIs "should
review the potential legal liability of the bank and its officers where failure to take
enforcement action as provided for in the loan documentation for known pollution or
the likelihood of pollution occurring, results in pollution occurring or continuing"). But
see Urrutia, supra note 42, § 16.07 (stating that one criticism of the Principles is that they
"do not create any type of legal obligation for banks").
81. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 ("Where a borrower is
not in compliance with its social and environmental covenants, EPFIs will work with the
borrower to bring it back into compliance to the extent feasible, and if the borrower
fails to re-establish compliance within an agreed grace period, EPFIs reserve the right to
exercise remedies, as they consider appropriate."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 16
("EPFIs will grant the borrower a grace period and attempt to work with them to
reestablish compliance."); Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 25 (interpreting
Principle 8 as "when a loan covenant is breached by a borrower, and it would constitute
a default by the borrower, then the lenders must 'engage' the borrower").
82. See THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 8, at 4 (establishing the
EPFI's right to exercise remedies against the borrower); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at
16-17 (discussing Principle 8).
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under Principle 10, taking into account the relevant
confidentiality issues.83 Finally, EPFIs are responsible for
establishing whether borrowers have complied with the
Principles.8 4 As a result of these requirements, EPFIs have
educated their staff and hired external consultants to achieve the
Principles' standards, which sometimes requires the EPFI to act
in the borrower's stead.85 Finally, a new set of governance rules
released in July 2010 ("Governance Rules")86 requires EPFIs to
make a commitment to comply with the Principles in a formal
contract ("Adoption Agreement").87
The Principles, however, also contain two elements that
tend to release an EPFI from responsibility. First, the preamble
states that the Principles serve as "a common baseline and
framework" for implementation in each project.8 8 Second, a
disclaimer that appears in the Principles and in the Governance
Rules states that no rights or liabilities are created by the
83. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, princ. 10, at 5 ("Each EPFI adopting
the Equator Principles commits to report publicly at least annually about its Equator
Principles implementation processes and experience, taking into account appropriate
confidentiality considerations."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 6-8 (discussing
Principle 10).
84. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 203 ("The EPFIs are responsible for
determining whether the borrower is in compliance with the Equator Principles."). See
generally THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2 (requiring in many instances that
borrowers meet "the satisfaction of the EPFI").
85. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 10 (stating that EPFIs have "recruited outside
specialists, trained and redeployed staff internally, or employed a mixture of both
strategies"). Hansen also describes numerous instances in which the EPFI acts on behalf
of the borrower to accomplish the goals of the Principles. For example, communities
and host governments may be more amenable to negotiating with an EPFI, rather than a
borrower. Id. at 14. In addition, an independent expert assigned to monitor the impacts
of a project may have a duty of care to the EPFI, rather than the borrower. Id. at 15.
86. See Press Release, The Equator Principles, New Governance Rules Introduced
for the Equator Principles (July 1, 2010), http://www.equator-principles.com/
documents/EPGovernanceRulesAnnouncelJuly20l0.pdf (discussing the release of the
new set of governance rules ("Governance Rules")).
87. See EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASSOCIATION GOVERNANCE
RULES 5 (2010), http://www.equator-principles.com/documents/EP Governance-
RulesApril_2010.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNANCE RULES] (requiring EPFIs to "make a
contractual commitment to comply with these Rules"); see also Equator Principles
Association Adoption Agreement, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (June 2010), http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Adoption-AgreementAug20O0.doc [hereinafter Adoption
Agreement] (requiring EPFIs to contractually agree to "put in place internal policies and
procedures for environmental and social risk management consistent with the Equator
Principles dated 6July 2006").
88. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1.
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Principles.89 Thus, although EPFIs have responsibilities pursuant
to the Principles, EPFI liability under the Principles appears to be
disclaimed.
The Principles are a set of social and environmental policies
that have reshaped the Industry approach to project finance.
While the Principles define the responsibilities of borrowers and
lenders on paper, in reality those obligations often are not fully
implemented.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRINCIPLES COMPLIANCE AND AN
OUTLINE OF THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY RIGHTS
Although the Principles aspire to create sustainable
practices in project finance, both borrowers and EPFIs often fail
to implement the Principles in practice.90 This failure results in
serious environmental and social impacts that leave project-
affected communities devastated and often without a legal
remedy.91 This Part discusses how the implementation of the
89. See id. at 5 ("The adopting EPFIs view these Principles as a financial industry
benchmark for developing individual, internal social and environmental policies,
procedures and practices. As with all internal policies, these Principles do not create any
rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private. Institutions are adopting and
implementing these Principles voluntarily and independently, without reliance on or
recourse to IFC or the World Bank."); see also Hansen, supra note 1, at 4 ("[L]ike all
internal policies, the Principles do not purport to create rights in, or liability to, third
parties."). Not all courts, however, have upheld disclaimers. See, e.g., McIlravy v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 74 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996), withdrawn, 98 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1996),
reinstated in part on other grounds on reh'g, 119 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
Wyoming law); Mecier v. Branon, 930 F. Supp. 165 (D. Vt. 1996) (applying Vermont
law).
90. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 15, at 76 (" [E]ven banks with relatively
strong policies are still supporting high profile projects that have unacceptable
environmental or social impacts."); see also Mathiason, supra note 7, at 38 (describing
civil society criticism of banks' failure to implement the Principles in practice). See
generally PLATFORM, PRINCIPAL OBJECTIONS: ANALYSIS OF THE SAKHALIN II OIL AND GAS
PROJECT'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES (2005) (describing deficiencies
in compliance with the Principles in the Sakhalin project).
91. See Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 9, at 207 ("[L]ocally-affected communities
have little effective access to justice under international law."); see also Ruggie, supra note
9, at 3 ("[G]ovemance gaps provide the permissive environment for wrongful acts by
companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation."); Justice Ian
Binnie, Legal Redress for Corporate Participation in International Human Rights Abuses BRIEF,
Summer 2009, at 44, 45 (explaining that "transnational companies have power and
influence . .. but without the public law responsibilities of statehood," which results in a
lack of remedies for human rights abuses committed by corporations). Despite the
recognition that corporations have committed human rights abuses, there is an inability
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Principles may fail in practice and the effect of such failure. In
addition, this Part explains the third-party-beneficiary right
under US contract law, which allows non-signatories to a contract
to enforce their rights against the contracting parties.
A. The Principles in Practice
Although a borrower must covenant to comply with the
Principles in order to obtain funding from an EPFI, borrowers
are able to circumvent the Principles in myriad ways.92 For
example, borrowers may avoid being categorized as high risk
through a process of segmentation during the assessment
period.93 Because borrowers typically divide a project into phases,
the Assessments often are based on isolated segments of the
project's lifespan.94 Thus, the Assessment may represent an
incomplete picture of the project's total impact on the local
community or ecosystem.95
Also, because many of the Principles require only that a
borrower meet "the satisfaction of the EPFI," no well-articulated
test exists to determine whether borrowers are in compliance.96
Thus, EPFIs and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
to police them-the International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over corporations
and there are practical problems in obtaining home country jurisdiction for entities with
activities abroad. Id. at 49.
92. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 207-10 (detailing various loopholes of the
Principles); see also Watchman, supra note 80, at 390 (noting that a survey conducted in
2004 found that "[tihe Equator Principles can be easily circumvented and there is
evidence which suggests that some sponsors and some banks discuss attempts to bypass
the Equator Principles in certain circumstances").
93. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 208 ("Segmentation, or piecemealing, occurs
when a party separates a number of related actions into individual actions."); see also
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 9:11 (2010) (describing the
segmentation problem).
94. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 208 ("Generally, a private company will
segment a project into phases or into individual but simultaneously implemented
actions.").
95. See id. ("By piecemealing the project in this fashion, a party can misrepresent
the overall environmental impact of the project. For example, a party that prepares
individual [Assessments] masks the project's overall environmental impact and avoids
considering the cumulative environmental impacts of the related actions."); see also
MANDELKER, supra note 93, § 9:11 (describing the segmentation problem).
96. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 5 ("[E]ach EPFI retains the discretion to fashion
policies and procedures tailored to their organization and the particular project under
review."); see also Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 210 (stating that the Principles fail to
'articulate a clear standard"); Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 21 ("The Principles
include several ambiguities concerning their scope and requirements.").
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often disagree as to whether a project satisfies Principles
standards.97 In addition, prior to the newly implemented
Governance Rules, the Principles did not address how to deal
with EPFIs that adopt the Principles in name but fail to
implement them in practice.98 Thus, noncompliant EPFIs gained
good publicity from their association with the Principles, while
affected communities suffered from a lack of implementation. 99
The Governance Rules begin to resolve this issue with procedures
for de-listing noncompliant EPFIs; the liberal criteria, however,
have met criticism.100
Finally, because the current regime recognizes legal redress
only by EPFIs, proper policing and enforcement by EPFIs
remains a primary concern.101 Monitoring of borrower
compliance is performed by the EPFIs themselves, thus the level
of oversight will depend on staff and resource allocation by each
EPFI. 0 2 This leads to inconsistent levels of monitoring among
EPFIs and a way for borrowers to avoid carrying out their
97. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 210 ("NGOs and EPFIs frequently disagree
on whether the requirements of the Equator Principles have been met prior to
funding."); PLATFORM, supra note 90 (noting deficiencies in compliance with the
Principles in the Sakhalin project). See generally Vivian Lee, Enforcing the Equator
Principles: An NGO's Principled Effort to Stop the Financing of a Paper Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 6
Nw. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 354 (2008) (discussing the disagreement between NGOs and
EPFIs).
98. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 210 (explaining that there is no recourse
against a bank that adopts the Principles in name only); see also Urrutia, supra note 42, §
16.07 (explaining that the voluntary nature of the Principles means compliance by
banks is also voluntary).
99. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 210 (describing the inadequate treatment of
noncompliant EPFIs); see also Watchman, supra note 80, at 394 (" [S]ome Equator banks
do not take their commitments as seriously as others.").
100. See GOVERNANCE RULES, supra note 87, at 6 (describing the criteria for de-
listing an EPFI); New Rules for Equator Principles, but No New Commitments from Banks,
BANKTRACK,JUly 1, 2010, available at http://www.banktrack.org/show/news/new-rules
for equatorprinciplesbutno-newcommitmentsfrom-banks ("It is disappointing
that the [Principles] Association has decided to choose 'meeting extremely limited
reporting requirements' and 'dutifully paying the membership fee' as the only two
criteria for such a decision.").
101. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 15, at 77-78 (discussing the need for a
monitoring and compliance mechanism independent of EPFIs); see also Urrutia, supra
note 42, § 16.07 ("There is no mechanism to confirm compliance with the Principles.").
102. See Urrutia, supra note 42, § 16.07 ("[I]mplementing the Principles requires
having enough trained staff knowledgeable in social and environmental issues."); see also
Hunter, supra note 3, at 460 (explaining the inconsistent application of Principles due
to EPFI staffing problems).
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promises. 03 As noted by Professor David B. Hunter, who has
written extensively about climate-change law in the international
context:
Because of well-recognized internal incentives to lend
money, [financial institution] project staff frequently view
environmental and social concerns as impediments to their
development role. The net result is somewhat frequent
examples of [financial institution] project staff downplaying
or ignoring significant environmental and social concerns
during project preparation ... . 0 4
Furthermore, the former general counsel to the World
Bank, Ibrahim Shihata, commented that, although covenants are
included in loan documentation, the covenants do not guarantee
actual compliance with social and environmental standards. 05 In
addition, after completion of a project, once the full amount of a
loan has been disbursed, the EPFI's ability to enforce compliance
is limited. 06 While the EPFI could declare that the borrower has
defaulted on its loan obligations, this is a severe path that IFIs
most likely would not be inclined to follow. 0 7 Although the
Principles create contractual obligations for both borrowers and
EPFIs, in practice there are many ways to avoid compliance. Such
noncompliance has serious implications for local communities.
103. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 227 ("[Q]uality and comprehensiveness of
these systems vary greatly depending on the financial institution"); see also Hansen, supra
note 1, at 10 ("M[Vast disparities in expertise threaten to hamper the Principles'
credibility . . . .").
104. Hunter, supra note 3, at 460; see Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 25
("[E]ven the arguably better-staffed IFIs occasionally find it difficult to effectively
monitor and enforce environmental and social standards.").
105. Ibrahim Shihata, The World Bank and the Environment: Legal Instruments for
Achieving Environmental Objectives, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 207-08
(1995) ("Appropriate covenants in the legal documents do not of course ensure by
themselves that the required action will be taken.").
106. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that enforcement of loan
covenants may be used to enforce compliance after loans are disbursed); id. at 15
(stating that EPFIs maintain control by withholding funds if social and environmental
standards are not upheld).
107. See Shihata, supra note 105, at 208 (explaining that the exercise of EPFI
remedies is "a serious path which has been avoided in practice"); see also HOFFMAN,
supra note 2, at 335 (suggesting that banks typically will not stop funding a project once
the initial loan is paid, despite a default).
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B. The Real Consequences of Lack ofAccountability under the
Pninciples
While insufficient monitoring by harried EPFI staff may
seem trivial, this lack of oversight has real-life consequences for
project-affected communities. One recent example is the Theun-
Hinboun Expansion Project in Laos, a dam and water diversion
project funded by three EPFIs that began construction in 2008.108
In addition to the detrimental environmental impacts, including
riverbank erosion and destruction of local fisheries, the project
will "displace 4,186 mostly indigenous people ... and displace or
negatively affect another 51,441 people living downstream, on
project construction lands, and in resettlement host villages."109
The borrower also failed to adhere to requirements under the
Principles and under national law.110 A May 2009 study found five
separate violations of the Principles and three violations of the
borrower's resettlement Action Plan.11' The violations of the
Principles included failure to create a monitoring mechanism for
certain environmental impacts, failure to report on good-faith
negotiations with project-affected communities, and failure to
provide displaced persons with options for resettlement.' 12
The project also violated a Laotian law that requires, among
other things, compensation for loss of assets and land for land
compensation for displaced persons."13 Because the project will
displace primarily indigenous and farming villages, this
108. See IKUKO MATSUMOTO, BANKTRACK ET AL., EXPANDING FAILURE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF THE THEUN-HINBOUN HYDROPOWER EXPANSION PROJECT'S COMPLIANCE
WITH EQUATOR PRINCIPLES AND LAO LAw 4 (2009)] (describing the Theun-Hinboun
project). The three EPFIs involved in the project are ANZ Banking Group, BNP Paribas,
and KBC. Id. The Expansion Project builds upon a previously existing water diversion
project that commenced operations in 1998 and has already caused severe detrimental
impacts on the environment and local communities. Id. at 7-8.
109. Id. at 4; see E. Souk, Laos Struggles with Dam Dilemma, NEWSMEKONG, Oct. 20,
2008, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44346 (reporting "greater frequency and
intensity of project-induced flooding" and disappearance of fish).
110. MATSUMOTO, supra note 108, at 5 (outlining the violations of the Principles
and Laotian law).
111. Id. at 5-6.
112. Id. at 6, 16 (describing the violations of the Principles).
113. See id. at 18 (explaining the violations of the Decree on the Compensation and
Resettlement of the Development Project in Lao PDR); see also AVIVA IMHOF, INTERNATIONAL
RiVERS, REVIEW OF DRAFT FINAL RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN FOR THEUN-HINBOUN
EXPANSION PROJECT, LAO PDR 1 (2008) (discussing inadequate resettlement provisions,
such as "no commitment to provide land-for-land" compensation).
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compensation is crucial to ensuring that the project-affected
communities maintain their livelihoods.'14 The borrower deemed
the "resettlement" of local villagers to be "relocation," which one
NGO understood as a way for the borrower to avoid its
obligations under the Principles and national law.115 Despite
these shortcomings, the April 2009 edition of Project Finance
magazine named the project "Asia-Pacific Multi-source Deal of
the Year 2008," indicating not only that the project has been
financed successfully, but also that failure to comply with the
Principles is not an affront to Industry standards.116
Environmental organizations challenged another EPFI,
Spain's Banco Santander, for its financing of hydroelectric dams
currently in construction on the Madeira River in Brazil, a major
tributary to the Amazon River.117 The project company failed to
obtain the free, prior, and informed consent of the indigenous
communities in project-affected areas. 118 The environmental
repercussions of the project included the killing of more than
eleven tons of fish, deforestation, and disease epidemics.119
114. See MATSUMOTO, supra note 108, at 18-19 (noting the words of one village
headman: "[W]e depend on natural resources in the village and there are many
resources here. In our village, we are self-sufficient."); see also IMHOF, supra note 113, at
4-7 (describing the insufficient provision of replacement livelihood options).
115. MATSUMOTO, supra note 108, at 13-14; see also IMHOF, supra note 113, at 10
(discussing the project's classification of the displacement of persons as "relocation"
rather than "resettlement").
116. See generally Theun Hinboun: Hydro against the Current, PROJECT FINANCE, Apr.
9, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR 26671893.
117. See Press Release, Amazon Watch, Spain's Banco Santander Criticized for
Hypocrisy Funding Destructive Dam in the Amazon while Adopting Green Principles
(May 14, 2009), available at http://www.amazonwatch.org/newsroom/view_news.php?
id=1797 (describing the controversial dam project and the EPFI's failure to comply with
the Principles); see also Deals & Developments: Furnas and Odebrecht Win Rio Madeira Hydro,
PROJECT FINANCE, Dec. 1, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 28152746 (noting that
opponents to the project estimate the number of people to be displaced at 10,000).
118. See Spain's Banco Santander Criticized, supra note 117 ("[T]he lack of the
free, prior, and informed consent of the impacted indigenous communities breaches
Convention 169 of the International Labor Organization, which was ratified by Brazil, as
well as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples."); see also
Amazon Indians Condemn Destructive Madeira River Dams, SURVIVAL INT'L, Sept. 24, 2010,
available at http://www.survivalinternational.org/news/6518 [hereinafter Amazon
Indians Condemn Dam] (stating that the affected indigenous communities were not
adequately consulted and did not grant their consent).
119. See Spain's Banco Santander Criticized, supra note 117 ("[D]am construction
has already caused an environmental disaster, including the killing of over 11 tons of
fish, which has led to fines of over ... US$4.26 million."); see also Amazon Indians
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Among the social changes caused by the construction are higher
rates of immigration, prostitution, and violence in the area,120
most likely caused by the influx of money and workers from
outside the local community. 121
Another controversial project is the development of the
Kashagan oil field in Kazakhstan, funded by BNP Paribas, an
EPFI. By the bank's own report, the project will result in the
emission of toxic "sour gas," such that the "significant climate
consequences. . . undermines the positive outcomes of any
financing in the renewable energy sector." 122 Although the
project began in 2002, in October 2008 the environmental and
social impact Assessment had not yet been published nor made
Condemn Dam, supra note 118 (stating that the Madeira river construction brings
"deforestation, the death of fish, dengue epidemics").
120. See Spain's Banco Santander Criticized, supra note 117 (noting that there are
"drastic environmental and social threats the projects pose to the region's complex and
fragile ecosystems as well as to the indigenous and traditional communities that rely on
the waterway for their survival"); see also Amazon Indians Condemn Dam, supra note 118
(stating that the Madeira river construction brings "large-scale immigration to the
area .. . and increased rates of prostitution and violence").
121. See, e.g., Tarek F. Maassarani et al., Extracting Corporate Responsibility: Towards a
Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 135, 140 (2007) (describing the
effects on a local community due to "sudden, drastic changes in the local economy-
commonly referred to as boomtown effects or 'Dutch Disease'-as the project gets
underway. The costs of domestic goods and services rise sharply, HIV/AIDS follows on
the tails of flourishing drug markets and prostitution, and labor is drawn away from
traditional public and private sectors such as education and subsistence agriculture");
Naomi Cahn, Corporate Governance Divergence and Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons From Out
Here in the Fields, 33 STETSON L. REV. 893, 911-12 (2004) (stating that the Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline Project resulted in "outside workers [causing] an increase in local
prostitution, HIV/AIDS, and substance abuse").
122. Banks Set to Finance Disastrous Kashagan Oil Project, CEE BANKWATCH NETWORK,
Oct. 8, 2008, available at http://bankwatch.ecn.cz/project.shtml?apc=147580-g-1&x=
2131442&d=r; see Work on Kashagan May Be Halted According to the Minister of
Environmental Protection, KAZAKHSTAN TODAY, Aug. 21, 2007, available at
http://www.crudeaccountability.org/en/index.php?mact=News,cntntOl,detail,0&cntnt
0larticleid=3&cntnt0ldetailtemplate=press&cntntOlreturnid=71 [hereinafter
KAZAKHSTAN TODAY] ("[A]mong the fundamental violations are the following: ...
placing an excess of industrial and consumption wastes into the environment over the
course of a number of years; ... unsanctioned flaring of waste in the sea; ... no detailed
report on the harmful impact of oil operations on the Caspian Sea's fish reserves, as
should have been prepared as a condition of the contract; and ... consistent
violations ... of the Republic of Kazakhstan's environmental protection legislation."
(citing a public statement by the Ministry of Environmental Protection of Kazakhstan)).
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available to project-affected communities, in violation of the
Principles. 123
Projects like the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project, the
Madeira River dams, and the Kashagan oil fields led a consortium
of NGOs to challenge EPFIs for espousing the Principles while
simultaneously lending to some of the world's most
environmentally and socially destructive projects.124 As a result,
EPFIs and NGOs convened in Zurich in February 2010 to discuss
methods for improving compliance with the Principles. A
summary published by one NGO in attendance noted, "The
meeting, while conducted in good spirit, did not result in any of
the concrete proposals . . . being accepted by banks as a way
forward with the Equator Principles."12 5
C. Third-Party-Beneficiary Status under US Contract Law
The third-party-beneficiary rule provides for a right to
promised performance enforceable by a non-signatory to a
contract.126 The basic requirement for third-party-beneficiary
status is establishing the intent of the contracting parties to
benefit a non-signatory, such that the non-signatory is classified
as an intended beneficiary of the contract.'27
123. See CEE BANKWATcH NETWORK, supra note 122 (stating in 2008 that the
Assessment had not yet been disclosed despite the project having been in development
since 2002).
124. See Mathiason, supra note 7 (describing the criticisms of EPFIs made by
NGOs).
125. BANKTRACK, GOING 'ROUND IN CIRCLES: AN OVERVIEW OF THE BANKTRACK-
EPFI ENGAGEMENT ON THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 2003-2010 8 (2010).
126. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (2009) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] (discussing the creation of a duty to a beneficiary); see also
Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule,
98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1985) (explaining that Fox "defied the prevailing rules of
contractual liability by holding that a third party .. .could . .. enforce [a contract]"). As
much as the third-party-beneficiary rule may challenge the textualist theory of contract
interpretation, it aligns with the intentionalist view that dominates the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts ("Second Restatement"), which deems the written language of a
contract to be evidence of the parties' intent, but is not determinative. See Sital Kalantry,
The Intent-to-Benefit: Individually Enforceable Rights under International Treaties, 44 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 63, 78-79 (2008) (stating that the intentionalist theory adopted by the Second
Restatement treats the written language of a contract as "probative, but not
conclusive").
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302.
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1. Intent to Benefit a Third Party
The seminal third-party-beneficiary case in the United
States, Lawrence v. Fox, provides a basic illustration of the
common-law right. The case arose when Holly, who owed
US$300 to Lawrence, lent US$300 to Fox in exchange for Fox's
promise to return the money to Lawrence the following day.
When Fox (promisor) failed to do so, Lawrence (third-party
beneficiary), and not Holly (promisee), sued Fox for the money
and prevailed. The New York Court of Appeals memorialized the
third-party-beneficiary rule as a "principle of law" requiring that
" [when] a promise [is] made to one for the benefit of another,
he for whose benefit it is made may bring an action for its
breach." 128 Courts have since elaborated on the Fox rule, leading
to both the qualification and expansion of its use to contexts
beyond the lender-debtor scenario.129
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts ("Second
Restatement") 1 30 codifies the third-party-beneficiary rule as " [a]
promise in a contract [that] creates a duty in the promisor to any
intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended
beneficiary may enforce the duty." 13 1 Thus, it is essential that the
parties intend for their contract to benefit a third party.132 More
importantly, the intention concerns whether a beneficiary has a
right to performance of the promise, not whether the parties
intend for the beneficiary to be able to enforce the promise.133
The Second Restatement also notes that to determine the intent
128. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 275 (1859) (finding third-party-beneficiary
status in a non-signatory to the contract).
129. See Kalantry, supra note 126, at 76 ("The Second Restatement broadened the
scope of third parties that have enforceable rights."). See generally Waters, supra note 126
(discussing the expansive use of the third-party-beneficiary rule).
130. The Fox rule is codified in both the Restatement (First) of Contracts ("First
Restatement") and the Second Restatement. The First and Second Restatements differ
in many ways, which Waters attributes to the influence of Williston in the First
Restatement and Corbin in the Second. See Kalantry, supra note 126, at 78-80
(discussing differences in the First and Second Restatements); Waters, supra note 126, at
1111 (discussing the Williston-Corbin discrepancy in the First and Second
Restatements). The most striking differences are in the classification of parties and the
method of contract interpretation. See Kalantry, supra note 126, at 78-80 (discussing
major differences between the First and Second Restatements).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 304.
132. See id. (discussing the creation of third-party-beneficiary status).
133. See id. § 302 (noting that an intended beneficiary "acquires a right by virtue of
a promise").
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of the parties, courts should consider not only the language of
the contract, but also the circumstances of the transaction. 34
2. Classifications of Beneficiaries
The Second Restatement further clarifies the Fox rule with a
test for intended and incidental beneficiaries, where the rights to
be afforded are defined by the type of beneficiary.'35 Unless
otherwise agreed by the parties to the contract, a third party is an
intended beneficiary of a contract if two conditions are
satisfied.136 First, acknowledging the third party's right to
performance properly carries out the intent of the contracting
parties.' 37 Second, either performance of a promise releases the
promisee from a debt or the circumstances demonstrate that
"the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance."13 8 Finally, any third party that is not an
134. See id. § 302, Reporter's Note, cmt. a ("A court in determining the parties'
intention should consider the circumstances surrounding the transaction as well as the
actual language of the contract.").
135. See id. § 302 ("(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to
performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties
and either (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee
to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. (2) An
incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended beneficiary.").
136. See id. (discussing the requirements for intended beneficiary status).
137. See id. ("[A] beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of
the parties.").
138. See id. ("[E]ither (a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation
of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that
the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised
performance."). Subsections (1) (a) and (b) describe classifications that appeared in the
First Restatement as either a creditor or a donee beneficiary. See id. cmts. b, c. Both
creditor and donee beneficiaries are third-party beneficiaries to a contract and therefore
have a right to the promised performance. See id. A creditor beneficiary is in the position
of Lawrence in Fox-the promisor's debt to the promisee is satisfied through fulfillment
of a promise which, rather than benefiting the promisee, benefits a third party. See id. A
donee beneficiary receives the fulfillment of a promise without having provided any
consideration-otherwise known as a "gift promise." See id. cmL c. In the gift promise
context, the beneficiary does not pay for the performance and has no obligation that
must be discharged. See id. ("[T]he promised performance is not paid for by the
recipient, discharges no right that he has against anyone, and is apparently designed to
benefit him . . . ."). While these distinctions still are evident in court opinions and in the
Second Restatement, the terminology is no longer used. See id. Reporter's Note.
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intended beneficiary is classified as an incidental beneficiary,
which has no third-party-beneficiary rights under a contract.13 9
In sum, the right of a non-signatory to enforce a contract is
determined by whether the non-signatory is an intended or an
incidental beneficiary.'# Whereas an intended beneficiary has a
right to enforce a promise in a contract, an incidental beneficiary
has no such right.141 The Second Restatement provides the
following illustration of intended beneficiaries:
A, the operator of a chicken processing and fertilizer plant,
contracts with B, a municipality, to use B's sewage system.
With the purpose of preventing harm to landowners
downstream from its system, B obtains from A a promise to
remove specified types of waste from its deposits into the
system. C, a downstream landowner, is an intended
beneficiary . ... 142
In this example, the two parties to the contract have some
overall purpose that is mutually beneficial to both. 43 There is,
however, an additional interest in a third party and a clear intent
to benefit that party through performance of the contract.'" This
is not the case with respect to incidental beneficiaries, who
obtain a secondary benefit from the parties' performance:
B contracts with A to erect an expensive building on A's
land. C's adjoining land would be enhanced in value by the
139. See id. ("An incidental beneficiary is a beneficiary who is not an intended
beneficiary.").
140. See id.
141. See id. cmt. a ("This Section distinguishes an 'intended' beneficiary, who
acquires a right by virtue of a promise, from an 'incidental' beneficiary, who does not.");
see also Alicea v. City of New York, 145 A.D.2d 315, 317 (1988) ("The law is settled that
an intended beneficiary may maintain an action to enforce an agreement to which it is
not actually a party, but an incidental beneficiary may not." (citations omitted)).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302. According to the Second
Restatement, Illustration 10 is based on Ratlaff v. Franz Foods, 468 S.W.2d 239 (Ark.
1971). Id. § 302, cmt. d, illus. 10.
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. d, illus. 10.
144. See Calamari v. Grace, 469 N.Y.S.2d 942, 945 (1983) ("It is a generally
accepted tenet of New York law that a duty directly assumed for the benefit of a
particular person or entity does not extend to third parties who were not intended
beneficiaries of the subject undertaking."); Pac. Carlton Dev. Corp. v. 752 Pac., LLC,
2007 WL 2781874 at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) ("[A] person who is not a party to an
agreement is without standing to enforce it, unless the parties to the agreement
intended to confer third-party beneficiary status upon them." (citations omitted)).
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performance of the contract. C is an incidental
beneficiary.145
In this example, the benefit to the third party is tangential
to the performance of the contract.14 6 While courts have debated
the application of the intended/incidental distinction,147
intended beneficiary status requires that the contracting parties
intend to confer a benefit that is more than merely coincidental
to the performance of their contract. 48
3. Implications of "Other Intended Beneficiaries"
The Second Restatement describes a third situation that
would include a class of "other intended beneficiaries."149 A third
party is an intended beneficiary based on a reliance argument,
i.e., where the third party would be reasonable to rely on a
promise that demonstrates the parties' intent to grant him a right
to performance.150 Reliance is reasonable where, for example, a
promisor promises to carry out a duty of the promise and that
duty is for the third party's benefit.15' Reasonable reliance may
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. e.
146. See, e.g., 4th Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66 N.Y.2d 38, 45
(1985) (explaining that a property owner was only an incidental beneficiary where the
demolition work on the property was performed not to benefit the owner but to protect
the public); Bd. of Managers of Arches at Cobble Hill Condo. v. Hicks & Warren, LLC,
2007 WL 556897, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) ("[T]he ordinary construction contract-
i.e., one which does not expressly state that the intention of the contracting parties is to
benefit a third party-does not give third parties who contract with the promisee the
right to enforce the latter's contract with another.... Such third parties are generally
considered mere incidental beneficiaries." (citations omitted)).
147. See 4th Ocean Putnam Corp., 66 N.Y.2d at 43 ("The intent to benefit test has,
however, been difficult to apply ... and a 'prolific source of judicial and academic
discussion"' (citations omitted)); Port Chester Elec. Constr. Co. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652,
653, 656 (1976) (disagreeing with the lower courts' theories and noting "the
interpretational difficulties prevalent in third-party beneficiary contracts").
148. See, e.g., Airco Alloys Div. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 430 N.Y.S.2d 179,
185-86 (4th Dep't 1980) ("An incidental beneficiary is a third party who may derive [a]
benefit from the performance of a contract though he is neither the promisee nor the
one to whom performance is to be rendered." (citing 2 WILuISTON, CONTRACTS § 402
(3d ed.)); 4th Ocean Putnam Corp., 66 N.Y.2d at 45 (explaining that a property owner is
only an incidental beneficiary where the demolition work on property was performed
not to benefit the owner but to protect the public).
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. d.
150. See id. ("[I]f the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying on the promise as
manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.").
151. See id. ("[A] promise to pay the promisee's debt ... or a gift promise involves
a manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor sufficient, in a contractual
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also be found in factors outside of the parties' manifest intent.152
For example, if "an overriding policy" demands it, a court may
find third-party-beneficiary status regardless of the intention of
the signatories.153 Thus, a court may look beyond the contract to
find a third-party-beneficiary right for policy reasons or due to
the third party's reasonable reliance on the contract.'54
4. Further Rules Pertaining to Intended Beneficiaries
The Second Restatement notes other considerations with
respect to intended beneficiaries. First, an intended beneficiary
need not be mentioned by name;155 it is sufficient that the
beneficiary is part of an identifiable class of people. 56 Second,
communication with the beneficiary is not required to create
third-party-beneficiary status.i57  Third, the promised
performance need not be provided directly to the beneficiary.158
For example, in the promise to pay a debt on behalf of a debtor,
the promise benefits the third party debtor in that it is rendered
setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable. Other cases
may be quite similar in this respect. Examples are a promise to perform a supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee . . . .").
152. See id. ("Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable,
considerations of procedural convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on
the manifested intention of the parties may affect the question . . . .").
153. See id. ("In some cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a
statute, requires recognition of such a right without regard to the intention of the
parties.").
154. See id. (discussing the ability to find third-party-beneficiary status due to policy
reasons or reasonable reliance); Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) ("One way to ascertain such intent is to ask whether the beneficiary would be
reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on
him." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302(1) (b), cmt. d)).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 308 ("It is not essential to the
creation of a right in an intended beneficiary that he be identified when a contract
containing the promise is made.").
156. County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010);
Montana, 124 F.3d at 1273 ("The intended beneficiary need not be specifically or
individually identified in the contract, but must fall within a class clearly intended to be
benefited thereby."); see also MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20:15 (2010) (noting that
courts recognize third-party-beneficiary status where a contract "was entered into to
secure an advantage for... a distinct class of people other than simply to protect the
public from harm").
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. c (stating that no contact
or communication with the beneficiary is necessary).
158. See id. § 302, cmts. a, c (stating that the beneficiary need not be "the person to
whom performance is to be rendered, the person who will receive the economic benefit,
or the person who furnished the consideration").
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debt-free, but the actual benefit of payment goes to the third
party's creditor. 59 Finally, for a third party to enforce contractual
rights, there must be a valid contract between the two
signatories.16 0
D. Variations on the Third-Party-Beneficiary Rule
The elements of a third-party-beneficiary claim are
fundamentally similar in all US jurisdictions, though courts and
states differ in important ways.16' New York courts apply a three-
pronged test for third-party-beneficiary status, in which a
nonparty must show:
(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract between
other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for his
benefit, and (3) that the benefit to him is sufficiently
immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the
assumption by the contracting parties to compensate him if
the benefit is lost.162
In addition, the crucial question of intent in the second
prong will be determined by the existence of one of two factors:
"(1) no one other than the third party can recover if the
promisor breaches the contract or (2) the language of the
contract otherwise evidences an intent to permit enforcement by
third parties."163 Some New York courts look to the surrounding
159. See id. § 302, cmt. c ("The contract need not provide that performance is to be
rendered directly to the beneficiary: a gift may be made to the beneficiary, for example,
by payment of his debt.").
160. See id. § 304, cmt. b ("The requirements for formation of a contract must of
course be met.. . ."); see, e.g., Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59
N.Y.2d 314, 336 (1983) (explaining that a party may recover "only by establishing ... the
existence of a valid and binding contract between other parties").
161. Waters, supra note 126, at 1111 ("In the United States, since the New York
Court of Appeals decided Lawrence v. Fox in 1859, it has become generally accepted that
a third party (one not party to the contract) may enforce a contractual obligation made
for his or her benefit." (citations omitted)).
162. Chen v. St. Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
(citing Cabrera v. DeGuerin, 1999 WL 438473, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1999)); see also
State of Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Shearman & Sterling, 95 N.Y.2d 427, 435-36
(2000) (stating the three-pronged test).
163. MBL Contracting Corp. v. King World Prods., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 492, 496
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Piccoli A/S v. Calvin Klein Jeanswear Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 157,
162 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)); see Premium Mortg. Corp. v. Equifax, Inc., 583 F.3d 103, 108
(2009) ("A non-party to a contract ... lacks standing to enforce the agreement in the
absence of terms that 'clearly evidence ... an intent to permit enforcement by the third
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circumstances to determine intent. 164 In contrast, the most-cited
California case on this issue states that intent is sufficiently
present if the promisor has understood the promisee's intent to
benefit a third party. 165
With respect to the classification of intended or incidental
beneficiaries, one New York court stated that absent intent to
benefit a third party, the third party is an incidental beneficiary
with no right to enforce the contract. 166 Another court applying
New York law, however, stated that, where performance of the
contract is made directly to the third party, that party is an
intended beneficiary.'67 Finally, the Ninth Circuit asserted that a
third-party beneficiary's right to sue need not be stated expressly
in the contract.168 Rather, the right to enforce a promise inheres
in one's status as an intended beneficiary-there is no
requirement for an additional provision to grant the right to
party."' (quoting 4th Ocean Putnam Corp. v. Interstate Wrecking Co., 66 N.Y.2d 38, 45
(1985))).
164. See, e.g., Westport Marina, Inc. v. Boulay, 2010 WL 1223238 at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2010) (examining the "timing, language, and financial obligations" of the
parties (citing Septembertide Pub., B.V. v. Stein and Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675, 679 (2d Cir.
1989))); Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc., 925 F.2d 566, 573
(2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the court may look to surrounding circumstances).
165. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591 (1961) ("Insofar as intent to benefit a
third person is important in determining his right to bring an action under a contract, it
is sufficient that the promisor must have understood that the promisee had such intent.
No specific manifestation by the promisor of an intent to benefit the third person is
required."). Other jurisdictions have different ways to determine whether the intent to
benefit exists. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Novus Int'l, Inc., 113 S.W.3d 418, 422
(Tex. App. 2003) (illustrating that Texas courts state that the intent to benefit "must be
clearly and fully spelled out in the four corners of the contract; otherwise, enforcement
of the contract by a third party must be denied"); CF Indus., Inc. v. Transcon. Gas Pipe
Line Corp., 448 F. Supp. 475, 480 (W.D.N.C. 1978) (explaining that the determination
of a third-party-beneficiary relationship must be found by looking "not only to the
contract terms but more generally to surrounding facts").
166. Port Chester Elec. Constr. Co. v. Atlas, 40 N.Y.2d 652, 653, 656 (1976) ("[A
contract] which does not expressly state that the intention of the contracting parties is to
benefit a third party .. . does not give third parties who contract with the promisee the
right to enforce the latter's contract with another. Such third parties are generally
considered mere incidental beneficiaries.").
167. Cauble v. Mabon Nugent & Co., 594 F. Supp. 985, 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
("Where performance is to be rendered directly to a third party under the terms of an
agreement, that party must be considered an intended beneficiary.").
168. County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[W]e reject the suggestion that the availability of a third party contract claim is
conditioned on the contract's inclusion of a provision expressly granting the third party
the right to sue. Any intended beneficiary has the right to enforce the obligor's duty of
performance; the right to sue inheres in one's status as an intended beneficiary.").
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sue.' 69 Decisions by courts have not been uniform. The unsettled
nature of these rules may work in favor of a plaintiff seeking
redress under a third-party-beneficiary theory, particularly where
an overriding public policy exists. 70
E. Notable Third Party Beneficiary Cases
Despite its various interpretations, courts have narrowly
applied the third-party-beneficiary rule. The following three cases
provide examples of courts' reasoning with respect to the third-
party-beneficiary rule. The New York case, Chen v. Street Beat
Sportswear, Inc., is an example of plaintiffs who successfully
proved third-party-beneficiary status. Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. illustrates how the third-party-beneficiary rule has been used
by non-US plaintiffs. Finally, Prouty v. Gores Technology Group
demonstrates how plaintiffs may overcome barriers to the third-
party-beneficiary claim.
1. Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc.
Chen v. Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. provides a useful
illustration of the third-party-beneficiary rule. Chen involved a suit
against a domestic clothing manufacturer, Street Beat
Sportswear, Inc., by its workers who alleged that they were third-
party-beneficiaries of a contract between the defendant and the
Department of Labor ("DOL").171 Through this contract, the
defendant had entered into an Augmented Compliance Program
Agreement ("ACPA"), which required the defendant to review,
monitor, and report on its contractors' compliance with the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 72
Applying the three-pronged test under New York law, the
court agreed with the plaintiffs' contract claim.173 The court
reasoned that the parties' intent to benefit the plaintiffs was clear
from the ACPA because every provision to evaluate and monitor
factories was for the sole purpose of protecting the factory
169. See id. at 1245 (discussing the right to sue).
170. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. d (stating that an
overriding policy may allow a finding of third-party-beneficiary status).
171. Chen v. St. Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 355 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
172. Id. at 358.
173. Id. at 365-66.
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workers.174 Thus, the court rejected the argument that the ACPA
was only evidence of intent to benefit the contractors, rather
than the workers. 75 In addition, the court disagreed with the
argument that the plaintiffs were merely incidental beneficiaries,
noting that intent may be established either by demonstrating
that only the third party would recover or by the express
language of the contract.'76 Although the language of the ACPA
provided for a recovery only by the DOL, the court rejected the
assertion that the parties never intended to permit enforcement
by outside parties.'77 Though the ACPA was silent on the issue of
enforcement by third parties, the intent to benefit the plaintiffs
could be interpreted from the contract as a whole.178 The court
also found that the third requirement of a "sufficiently
immediate" benefit had been satisfied.179 Because the ACPA
required the defendant to evaluate and report on violations and
to compensate workers within a specified period, the court found
the scheme to be sufficiently immediate. 80
Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiffs were the
intended beneficiaries of the ACPA, the parties had specific
intent to benefit the plaintiffs and, as a result, the plaintiffs had
standing to sue for breach of the contract.','
2. Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
In Wal-Mart Stores, the company's published code of conduct
and alleged failure to comply with the code led non-US plaintiffs
to file an action against Wal-Mart in California. 82 The plaintiffs
174. Id. at 363.
175. Id. at 364. The court focused on a phrase in the Augmented Compliance
Program Agreement ("ACPA") that explicitly required the defendant to pay wages to
the employees of contractors who violated the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. The court
found that this was a sufficient basis to recognize "a right to performance in the
beneficiary." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302(1)).
176. Id. at 362 n.7. By the language of the ACPA, the court found it obvious that
the purpose of the ACPA was to ensure that workers were paid appropriately. Id. at 363.
177. Id. at 365.
178. Id. (citing Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979)).
179. Id. (stating that the third element inquires into "whether the benefit to the
factory workers would be sufficiently immediate to indicate the assumption by the
contracting parties of an obligation to compensate them if the benefit is lost").
180. Id. at 365-66.
181. Id. at 366.
182. See generally Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 2009).
For commentary, see Debra Cohen Maryanov, Sweatshop Liability: Corporate Codes of
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were employees at factories in Bangladesh, China, Indonesia,
Nicaragua, and Swaziland that supplied products directly to Wal-
Mart.'83 Wal-Mart's code of conduct, which was expressly part of
the contract between Wal-Mart and its supplier factories,
required that all suppliers comply with local labor laws and allow
Wal-Mart to audit the factories to ensure compliance with the
code.'84 The plaintiffs argued that because the code was for the
benefit of the workers, Wal-Mart's contract with their employer
provided them with third-party-beneficiary status and standing to
sue Wal-Mart for failing to enforce the standards. 85
Both the United States District Court for the Central District
of California and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed
with the third-party-beneficiary claim for two reasons.186 First,
Wal-Mart's reservation of rights to inspect the suppliers' factories
did not amount to a promise by Wal-Mart to uphold its code of
conduct.187 Second, the court noted that a promise creates a duty
of performance in the promisor, not the promisee. 88 Because
the Wal-Mart contracts required a promise by the supplier to
comply with local labor laws, Wal-Mart was in fact not the
promisor-rather, the suppliers were the promisors.'89 Thus, the
plaintiffs sought performance from the incorrect party to the
contract. 90 Because the plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts to
show third-party-beneficiary status, the court dismissed the
plaintiffs' contract claim.191
3. Prouty v. Gores Technology Group
In Prouty, the California Court of Appeals recognized a
third-party-beneficiary right in plaintiffs who had been denied
severance benefits, despite the existence of a "no third party
Conduct and the Governance of Labor Standards in the International Supply Chain, 14 LEWIS &
CLIARK L. REV. 397, 431-36 (2010).
183. Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d at 680.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 681.
186. Id. at 681-82.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 682.
189. Id. (noting that Wal-Mart was the promisee).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 304 ("A promise in a contract
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the
promise... .").
191. Wal-Mart Stores, 572 F.3d at 682.
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beneficiaries" clause (also known as a negation clause) in the
underlying contracts.192 Gores Technology Group ("GTG")
agreed to purchase all of the capital stock of VeriFone, Inc. from
Hewlett Packard ("HP"). 193 The stock purchase agreement
included a clause in which GTG agreed to offer benefits to
VeriFone employees, with the exception of severance benefits.194
HP introduced an amendment in section 6 that specifically
provided for severance benefits, which GTG signed.195 Although
the agreement included a "no third party beneficiaries" clause in
section 10.5,196 the amendment indemnified HP against liabilities
"recovered by a third party."197 Within one week of the closing,
GTG breached the section 6 amendment by terminating
VeriFone employees without providing severance packages.198
The employees brought suit against GTG, asserting their rights as
third-party beneficiaries under section 6 of the agreement. 199
To determine whether the plaintiffs had standing to sue as
third-party beneficiaries, the court interpreted the language of
the contract as a whole as well as the circumstances of the
transaction. 200 The court found that the amendment in section 6
was "a classic third party provision," with the sole purpose of
benefiting the employees. 201 The court rejected the argument
that GTG had no intent to benefit the plaintiffs through the
inclusion of section 6 because GTG itself gained nothing from
the clause. 202 The court found that the language of the contract
and the negotiations were sufficient to show that the parties
expressly intended the employees to be third-party
beneficiaries.203
192. Prouty v. Gores Tech. Grp., 121 Cal. App. 4th 1225, 1225 (2004).




197. Id. at 1228.
198. Id. at 1229.
199. Id. at 1232.
200. Id. at 1233 (interpreting "the contract as a whole ... in light of the
uncontradicted evidence of the circumstances and negotiations of the parties in making
the contract").
201. Id.
202. Id. ("It is difficult for GTG to argue section 6 did not intend to benefit
plaintiffs when GTG gained nothing from agreeing to its terms.").
203. Id. at 1234.
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The court rejected the defendants' argument that the
negation clause in section 10.5 was controlling.20 The court
reasoned that if the parties had not intended to benefit the
plaintiffs, they would not have agreed to the amendment.20 In
addition, the court found that sections 6 and 10.5 were in direct
contradiction-one expressly denying rights to third parties, the
other expressly granting them.206 Under the rules of contract
interpretation, "when a general and a particular provision are
inconsistent, the particular and specific provision is paramount
to the general provision." 207 Thus, the court found that section 6
was an exception to section 10.5, enabling the plaintiffs to
enforce it.208 The court cited the Second Restatement: "In
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public
interest is generally preferred."2 1
F. Barriers for Plaintiffs Asserting a Third-Party-Beneficiary Claim in
US Courts
Several roadblocks, both legal and practical, exist for
plaintiffs pursuing claims under the third-party-beneficiary
theory.
1. Express Negation Clauses
In New York, an express clause negating the creation of a
third-party-beneficiary right is controlling.210 The US Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, recently determined in
Halliburton Company Benefits Committee v. Graves that a negation
clause in a merger agreement did not preclude enforcement of a
204. Id. at 1236. Defendants raised the argument that under East Bay Municipal
Utility District v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 93 Cal. App. 3d 346 (1979), the negation
clause should control. Prouty, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 1236. The court distinguished East
Bay on the ground that the contracts in that case did not contain a provision similar to
Section 6. Id. (citing E. Bay Mun., 93 Cal. App. 3d at 357).
205. Id. at 1234.
206. Id. at 1235.
207. Id. (citations omitted).
208. Id.
209. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 207).
210. See, e.g., Morse/Diesel, Inc. v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 859 F.2d 242, 249 (2d Cir.
1988) ("[W]here a provision in a contract expressly negates enforcement by third-
parties, that provision is controlling."); Nepco Forged Prods., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co.
of N.Y., Inc., 470 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (stating same).
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contract by a third-party beneficiary.21' In addition, not every
contract will contain such a clause.
The rules of contract interpretation may also provide
assistance to plaintiffs fighting a negation clause. First, there is a
presumption in favor of negotiated terms, rather than standard
or boilerplate terms.212 Second, a contract will be interpreted
such that none of its terms are superfluous.213 These rules may
provide some leeway for plaintiffs to circumvent a negation
clause.
2. Jurisdictional Issues for International Plaintiffs
International plaintiffs bringing suit in US court for wrongs
committed abroad often encounter jurisdictional issues.214
Defendants would surely raise jurisdictional defenses such as
forum non conveniens, and other issues, such as concerns about
international comity, which have been well documented
elsewhere.215 On the other hand, most contracts contain choice-
211. Halliburton Co. Benefits Comm. v. Graves, 463 F.3d 360, 375-76 (5th Cir.
2006). The suit was by employees seeking to enforce an amendment to their medical
plan. See id. The court reasoned that although a negation clause existed in the merger
agreement, this did not preclude plaintiffs from seeking a remedy under ERISA. Id. at
375-76; see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Siemens Westinghouse Power Corp., 2001 WL
91714 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2001) at *1 (finding third-party-beneficiary status under the
purchase order despite a negation clause in the asset purchase agreement that
incorporated the purchase order by reference); Prouty, 121 Cal. App. 4th at 1237
(finding third-party-beneficiary status despite a negation clause).
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 203.
213. Id.; see also Laba v. Carey, 29 N.Y.2d 302, 308 (1971) ("[A] court should not
'adopt an interpretation' which will operate to leave a 'provision of a contract...
without force and effect.'" (citations omitted)).
214. See Binnie, supra note 91, at 49 (discussing the lack of jurisdiction of courts
over entities doing business internationally). See generally Alexandra Reeve, Within Reach:
A New Strategy for Regulating American Corporations that Commit Human Rights Abuses
Abroad, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 387 (discussing jurisdictional barriers in the context
of the Alien Tort Claims Act and other torts involving international plaintiffs).
215. See, e.g., Reeve, supra note 214, at 388; Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome":
Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV.
598, 608-09 (1990) (discussing the presumption against extraterritoriality in US courts).
The Wal-Mart court never addressed the jurisdiction question. Jane Doe v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 685 n.6 (stating that because plaintiffs claims had failed, the
court "need not address Wal-Mart's additional contentions that United States domestic
law does not apply and that foreign affairs preemption bars application of state law").
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of-law clauses, and all of the fifty states in the United States
recognize a third-party-beneficiary right in some form.216
3. Practical Issues for International Plaintiffs
Non-US plaintiffs may also be barred from bringing a lawsuit
in US court for practical reasons. Plaintiffs may lack resources as
well as knowledge about laws, court systems, or other
mechanisms.217 In addition, confidentiality issues may bar
plaintiffs from discovering the terms of a contract in order to
assert their third party right.2 18
Under the third-party-beneficiary rule, a non-signatory to a
contract may enforce a promise in a contract if it can be shown
that the parties intended to benefit the non-signatory. Non-US
plaintiffs, particularly, must overcome multiple barriers to prove
third-party-beneficiary status. In the context of international
project finance, where project-affected communities often have
no recourse against a project with negative impacts, third-party-
beneficiary status may provide a remedy.
III. THE PRINCIPLES AS A WINDOW TO THIRD-PARTY-
BENEFICIARY STA TUS FOR PROJECT-AFFECTED
COMMUNITIES
As a set of global, social, and environmental standards, the
Principles are a step toward sustainable practices for project
finance. The failure of many projects to implement the
Principles, despite promising to abide by them in financing
documentation, presents a serious threat to the livelihoods of
project-affected communities. The lack of monitoring and
216. Waters, supra note 126, at 1111 (noting that third-party-beneficiary status is
"generally accepted" in the United States).
217. See Ruggie, supra note 9, at 6 ("[C]onsiderable numbers of individuals whose
human rights are impacted by corporations, lack access to any functioning mechanism
that could provide [a] remedy."); Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 9, at 218 (stating
that "[liocally-affected communities and their international allies frequently have
evidence of significant environmental and social damage" with no mechanism for
accountability).
218. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing the justification for confidentiality in
the context of international project finance); Urrutia, supra note 42, § 16.07 (stating
that the inability of the local community to access the confidential terms of a loan
agreement creates a "conflict between the principle of access to information and the
principle of confidentiality of negotiations").
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enforcement by EPFIs only compounds the problem. In light of
this, a new method to hold borrowers accountable for failing to
adhere to the Principles is necessary.219
As indicated by the Principles' requirement of public
consultation,220 the entities most appropriate to monitor the
effects of a project, and with the highest stake in the event of
noncompliance, are the affected communities themselves.221 One
potential way to ensure that borrowers and EPFIs uphold their
promises under the Principles is to recognize a third-party-
beneficiary right for those project-affected communities. Under
US contract law, affected communities would have standing to
sue through the Principles.222 Unfortunately, no such lawsuit has
been reported, thus no guiding precedent exists.223
This Part argues that the Principles successfully create third-
party-beneficiary status for project-affected communities. In
addition, this Part discusses the implications of Chen, Wal-Mart,
and Prouty for the Industry and the potential liability of EPFIs
themselves. Finally, this Part addresses barriers to bringing and
winning a lawsuit under the third-party-beneficiary theory in the
international project finance context.
A. The Principles Lead to the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary
Status
The Principles show that EPFIs and borrowers intend to
benefit project-affected communities directly.22 4  Because
borrowers covenant to comply with the Principles, which exist for
219. See supra notes 90-125 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of
the Principles, the real consequences of failing to comply with the Principles, and the
EPFls' inability to monitor compliance).
220. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing Principles 5 and 6,
which require borrowers to communicate adequately with affected communities).
221. See Bridgeman & Hunter, supra note 9, at 190 (explaining that social and
environmental standards are meant to benefit local communities, but no mechanisms
exist to provide the communities with ways to hold companies accountable for their
acts); Hunter, supra note 3, at 461 (noting the critical monitoring and implementation
role that civil society organizations play).
222. See supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the
Principles); notes 126-60 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of third-
party-beneficiary status).
223. See Hardenbrook, supra note 6, at 199, 218. Additionally, this author's search
did not find any reported lawsuits.
224. See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Principles in
detail).
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the purpose of protecting project-affected communities, the
inclusion of the Principles in loan documentation effectively
creates third-party-beneficiary status for project-affected
communities. 225 Thus, borrowers as promisors owe duties of
performance to project-affected communities that, if breached,
are enforceable by the communities. In turn, project-affected
communities should be able to assert their third-party-beneficiary
rights through breach of contract actions in US courts.
1. The Principles as Proof of Intent to Benefit a Third Party
The Principles show a clear intent to benefit project-affected
communities. The preamble to the Principles states: "We believe
that adoption of and adherence to these Principles offers
significant benefits to ... local stakeholders." 226 In addition, the
EPFIs' reason for creating the Principles was to curb negative
environmental and social impacts on local communities.227 While
there may be reputational benefits for EPFIs, implementing the
Principles has placed increased burdens on both lenders and
borrowers.228 A project inevitably incurs financial burdens and
timing setbacks that deter compliance.229 Significant resources
must be diverted to create and manage Action Plans.230 There
appear to be greater losses than gains for projects that abide by
the Principles. This suggests that there is little incentive to adopt
the Principles other than to provide a benefit to affected
communities.
2. The Benefit Conferred is More than Merely Tangential
As noted above, the creation of intended beneficiary status
that confers on a third party the right to promised performance
225. See supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the
Principles); notes 126-60 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of third-
party-beneficiary status).
226. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1.
227. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (citing the Preamble to the
Principles).
228. See Lawrence & Thomas, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that imposing standards is
not necessarily in the best interest of the lender).
229. Id. ("Requiring... compliance would increase the operating costs of the
project, and reduce the project's financial viability.").
230. See Hansen, supra note 1, at 12 ("Undertaking an [Assessment] for a major
project is itself an expensive commitment. . . .").
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turns on the existence of intent to benefit a third party.23 ' In
project financing contracts, the Principles are for the benefit of
project-affected communities and adequately manifest the intent
necessary to establish intended beneficiary status.232 The
Principles create a situation analogous to the example in the
Second Restatement.233 In the factory operator example,234 the
municipality requires that the operator promise not to harm
downstream residents, effectively creating intended beneficiary
status in the downstream residents.235 To envision the Principles
in this example, the EPFI would be the municipality, and the
borrower would be the factory operator, thus conferring
intended beneficiary status on the project-affected community.
Finally, based on the reliance argument discussed in Part
II.C.3, a court could find that a project-affected community is in
the class of "other intended beneficiaries."2 3 6 The Second
Restatement states that "if the beneficiary would be reasonable in
relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a
right on him, he is an intended beneficiary."2 37 Based on this
theory, the argument would be as follows. Borrowers covenant to
abide by the Principles, which are expressly for the purpose of
mitigating negative impacts on project-affected communities.238
Thus, based on the Principles, communities would be reasonable
in believing that EPFIs and borrowers intend to implement the
Principles for their benefit. This reasonable reliance on the
promises creates third-party-beneficiary rights in the affected
communities. Should a court doubt this proposition, the
overriding policy to compensate injured parties could serve as an
additional basis for finding intended beneficiary status. In sum,
because project-affected communities are the intended
231. See supra notes 126-60 and accompanying text (discussing the third-party-
beneficiary rule).
232. See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Principles in
detail).
233. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text (discussing the factory operator
example in the Second Restatement).
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302.
235. Id.
236. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text (discussing "other intended
beneficiaries" as a class of intended beneficiary).
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 302, cmt. d.
238. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing Principle 8, which
requires borrowers to covenant to abide by the Principles in loan documentation).
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beneficiaries of the Principles, they have a right to proper
implementation of the Principles. 239
3. Other Requirements to Establish Third-Party-Beneficiary
Status Are Met
The other requirements to establish third-party-beneficiary
status for project-affected communities are likely met in a project
finance deal.2 40 First, a project-affected community is an
identifiable class of people.241 The Principles assume this to be
true-if it were not, the requirement of consultation and
participation by a "free, prior and informed" group of local
stakeholders242 would be fatal to all EPFI-funded projects. In
addition, the benefits that may flow from Assessments and Action
Plans would directly benefit individuals. 243 Projects that have only
environmental impacts would still qualify under this theory
because changes in the environment directly impact individuals,
particularly in agrarian communities. Finally, given the
magnitude of a typical project finance deal, a valid contract will
usually exist.24
B. Case Law Supports the Recognition of Third-Party-Beneficiary
Status
In light of these considerations, the Principles effectively
confer third-party-beneficiary status upon project-affected
communities. The analysis below of Chen, Wal-Mart Stores, and
Prouty will show how a claim under the Principles would be
successful.
239. See supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text (discussing the right to
performance as contingent on classification as an intended beneficiary).
240. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (discussing further rules that
must be satisfied in order to establish status as an intended beneficiary).
241. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (intended beneficiaries must be
part of an identifiable class of persons).
242. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 5; see supra note 67 and
accompanying text (discussing the "free, prior and informed" community requirement).
243. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Action Plans and
Assessments required by the Principles).
244. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text (discussing project finance).
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1. Implications of Chen: A Viable Claim Pursuant to the
Principles
Several features of Chen suggest that a third-party-beneficiary
breach-of-contract claim pursuant to the Principles would be
viable under New York law. As noted in Section II.C, Chen
involved the suit against Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. by its
employees for failing to uphold the DOL standards embodied in
the ACPA in its employment practices.245 Like the ACPA, the
Principles are a set of standards that are for the benefit of third
persons. 246 As in Chen, a borrower's argument that the Principles
are for their own benefit would be rejected in light of the
Principles' clear, overriding purpose.247 Also, similar to the
employer in Chen, an EPFI borrower is a private actor that is
contractually obligated to adhere to a set of standards for
evaluation, monitoring, and reporting for the benefit of an
identifiable class of persons. 248
In Chen, the court found a right to performance in the
beneficiary based on the explicit requirement that the
defendants pay wages to the employees.249 As for the Principles,
the requirements to follow an Action Plan and affirmatively
manage a project's impacts and riskS25 0 provides a right to
performance in affected communities, which are the direct
recipients of those impacts and risks. At the very least, the
requirements to hold consultations and create grievance
mechanisms25' are actions that benefit the community, giving rise
to a right to performance in the community. In addition,
although the Principles do not expressly provide for recovery by
communities, a court could "glean [] from the contract as a
whole"25 2 the parties' intent to benefit the project-affected
245. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text (discussing Chen).
246. See supra notes 54-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Principles).
247. See supra notes 54-57, 171-81 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose
of the Principles and the court's reasoning in Chen).
248. See supra notes 54-87, 156, 171-81 and accompanying text (discussing the
borrower's obligations under the Principles, requirement of an identifiable class of
people, and the court's reasoning in Chen).
249. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Chen court's
approach to the "sufficiently immediate" requirement).
250. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Action Plan
required by the Principles).
251. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text (discussing Principles 5 and 6).
252. Chen v. St. Beat Sportswear, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 2d 355, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
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communities. Finally, as to the third element of "sufficiently
immediate" benefit,253 the Principles require compliance within
an agreed grace period.254 For high-risk projects, the Principles
also require free, prior, and informed consultation. 255 Thus,
sufficient immediacy is established by the Principles.
Taking these considerations as a whole, it is likely that a
plaintiffs third-party-beneficiary contract claim based on the
Principles would be successful in a US court. To put this in the
context of enforcing international standards for human rights,
Wal-Mart Stores is instructive.
2. Implications of Wal-Mart Stores- A Stronger Case under the
Principles
In Wal-Mart Stores, employees of Wal-Mart's international
suppliers sued Wal-Mart for failing to abide by the employment
practices required by its contracts with suppliers.256 Wal-Mart
Stores is significant because a claim under the Principles would
have none of the deficiencies that the Court deemed fatal to
plaintiffs' claim. First, for projects in Categories A or B, a
borrower expressly must promise to abide by the relevant host
country's laws and the EPFI-approved Action Plan. 25 7 Had Wal-
Mart promised to monitor and enforce the employment
standards, it would have breached the contract by failing to do
so.258 The Principles require that borrowers promise to monitor
and enforce standards via the Action Plan. 25 9 Thus, the lack of a
discernible promise that caused the plaintiffs to lose in Wal-Mart
Stores would not figure into an analysis under the Principles.
Second, unlike the EPFI, the borrower is expressly required to
covenant to abide by the Principles in loan documentation,
placing the borrower in the position of promisor.260 Thus, the
253. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (discussing "sufficiently
immediate").
254. See supra notes 81 and accompanying text (discussing the specified grace
period).
255. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement for
"free, prior and informed" consultation).
256. See supra notes 182-91 and accompanying text (discussing Wal-Mart Stores).
257. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing Principle 8).
258. See Maryanov, supra note 182, at 434 ("[I]f Wal-Mart had promised to monitor
and enforce the Standards, then failure to do so would have constituted a breach.").
259. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text (discussing the Action Plan).
260. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text (discussing Principle 8).
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result in Wal-Mart Stores would be avoided because a third-party
beneficiary would sue the party that promised performance, i.e.,
the borrower.
3. Implications of Prouty: Potential Loopholes for the Weary
Plaintiff
Although the case took place in a different context, the
situation in Prouty is analogous to that which would exist under
the Principles where an EPFI requires the borrower to promise to
provide specific benefits to third parties. Prouty involved a
severance payment clause that the court of appeals found created
a "classic" third-party-beneficiary right in the defendant's former
employees.261 Because of the Principles' clear intent to benefit
project-affected communities, a court would likely find the
Principles to be another classic third-party provision. In addition,
although most financing documentation does contain a negation
clause, Prouty demonstrates that overcoming such a clause is
possible.262 The court's reasoning indicates that where negation
clauses are considered to be controlling, such as under New York
law, the Principles' clear intent to benefit project-affected
communities could persuade a court to find an exception to the
rule. 263 Finally, given the detrimental impacts of unregulated
projects discussed in Part II.B and the often skewed bargaining
positions of borrowers vis-A-vis affected communities, a court
should find a third-party-beneficiary right.
C. Potential Liability of the EPFIs
The proposition that EPFIs could be held liable for damage
caused by EPFI-funded projects is unsettled, even for members of
the Industry. 64 As noted in Part I, EPFIs are charged with
determining whether borrowers are in compliance with the
Principles. In addition, pursuant to Principles 8 and 10, an EPFI
will assist the borrower to remain in compliance and commits to
261. See supra notes 192-209 and accompanying text (discussing Prouty).
262. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Prouty court's
decision).
263. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the Prouty court's
treatment of the negation clause).
264. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing lender liability).
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publishing reports of its projects annually.26 5 It is unclear,
however, whether the potential for liability would increase as
EPFIs engage in more affirmative actions to monitor and ensure
compliance by their borrowers.266
The Principles, however, do not require EPFIs to covenant
to these responsibilities in loan documentation. The Second
Restatement is clear that a promise creates a duty in the
promisor, not the promisee. 267 As in Wal-Mart Stores, because
EPFIs are the promisees with respect to the Principles, it is
unlikely that they would be held liable for the borrower's
(promisor's) breach.268 If, however, an EPFI signs a contract with,
for example, an outside expert to monitor and report on the
social and environmental impacts of a project, that contract
could potentially form the basis of a third-party-beneficiary claim
against the EPFI.
The new Governance Rules, which require EPFIs to
contractually commit to the Principles through the Adoption
Agreement, provides just such a situation. In the Adoption
Agreement, an EPFI makes a contractual commitment to abide
by the Governance Rules and to implement processes to remain
in compliance with the Principles. 269 Thus, with respect to the
Adoption Agreement, each individual EPFI is a promisor. Like
the Principles, the Governance Rules were adopted to ensure
greater compliance by EPFIs for the benefit of project-affected
communities. Similar to the liability of borrowers that covenant
to adhere to the Principles, the Adoption Agreement could
subject an EPFI to liability from third-party beneficiaries if the
EPFI fails to uphold its promises under the Governance Rules.
265. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing responsibilities of
EPFIs pursuant to the Principles).
266. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 1, at 30 ("[T]he EPFI's intensive monitoring
activities and remedial powers make liability for knowingly permitting, participating in,
or failing to prevent pollution a serious threat.").
267. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (discussing the third-party-
beneficiary rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 304 (stating the third-party-
beneficiary rule as "[a] promise in a contract creates a duty in the promisor to any
intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce
the duty."); see alsoJane Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2009)
(finding no liability on the part of the promisee).
268. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text (discussing the court's
reasoning in Wal-Mart Stores with respect to the liability of promisees).
269. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Governance
Rules).
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The Principles contain two elements that weigh against EPFI
liability. First, the lenders themselves consider the Principles to
be merely a set of voluntary guidelines.270 Second, the disclaimer
stating that the Principles do not "create any rights in, or liability
to, any person, public or private," appears in both the Principles
and the Governance Rules.271 This disclaimer could establish that
an EPFI is not liable to any third parties. In addition, because the
disclaimer in the Principles specifies "as with all internal
policies,"272 this disclaimer could negate the liability of an EPFI.
Once the Principles are included in a contract with a borrower,
however, this disclaimer may no longer apply because the
contract terms themselves create liabilities between the parties.
In addition, several courts have found disclaimers to be
ineffective.273
There are some public policy reasons for not shifting the
burden of liability from the borrowers to the EPFIs. First, the
borrower is in the best position to ensure compliance with the
Principles, not the EPFI.274 Second, imposing liability on an EPFI
for a borrower's failure might discourage banks from adhering to
the Principles at all, and such discouragement would be counter-
productive to the stated goal of ensuring greater socially and
environmentally responsible development.275
D. Barriers to the Project-Affected Plaintiffs Claim in US Courts
1. Principles and the Right to Sue
One potential problem for project-affected communities
seeking to sue on this theory may be the argument that the
Principles do not purport to create an enforcement right. As
noted in Part I.D, the preamble to the Principles states that they
are guidelines for implementation in each project.2 76 In addition,
270. About the Equator Principles, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the Principles are "a
voluntary set of standards").
271. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the disclaimer).
272. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, at 5.
273. See supra note 89 (discussing the effectiveness of disclaimers generally).
274. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text (discussing the responsibilities
of the borrower pursuant to the Principles).
275. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2, pmbl., at 1 (stating that the Principles
are "a common baseline and framework").
276. Id.
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the disclaimer states that no rights or liabilities are created by the
Principles.277 These facts could pose a problem for a plaintiff
bringing an action in New York court.
As noted in Part II.D, there are variations in the application
of the third-party-beneficiary rule. One fundamental difference
lies in the recognition of a third party's right to enforce a
contract.278 For example, the New York rule states that intent, the
second prong of the three-prong test, can be gleaned from
whether "the language of the contract otherwise evidences an
intent to permit enforcement by third parties."279 This is a
fundamentally different inquiry than whether the parties
intended to benefit a third party. Rather, the New York rule asks
whether the parties intended for the party to be able to sue. This
approach, however, was specifically rejected by the Ninth Circuit
in Astra USA, where the court noted that the right to sue
"inhere's in one's status as an intended beneficiary."2 80
The Ninth Circuit's reading of the rule is more consistent
with the Second Restatement than the New York rule. The
Second Restatement defines third-party-beneficiary status by the
intent to benefit, not the intent to create a right to sue. 28 1 By
hinging third-party-beneficiary status on an enforcement right,
the New York rule circumvents the very purpose of the rule-to
glean an enforcement right from the parties' intent to benefit
the non-signatory. As stated in Fox, when a promise is made with
the intent to benefit a third party, the third party may sue upon
breach of the promise.282 To additionally require that parties
expressly allow the third party to bring an action for breach
would be duplicative-the right arises from the third party's
status as an intended beneficiary.283 To first ask whether a party
277. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the disclaimer).
278. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text (discussing variations on the
third-party-beneficiary rule).
279. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing the intent prong of the
third-party-beneficiary rule in New York law).
280. County of Santa Clara v. Astra USA, Inc., 588 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2010).
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 126, § 304 ("A promise in a contract
creates a duty in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the promise, and
the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty.").
282. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268, 274 (1859) (citations omitted).
283. Astra USA, 588 F.3d at 1245 ("To require additionally of intended
beneficiaries that the contract by its terms provide for third party enforcement would
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can sue and then find intent, or the lack thereof, is a backward
inquiry.
With respect to the Principles, although no enforcement
right is expressly given to third parties under the Principles, the
New York rule should not defeat the claim. The intent to benefit
project-affected communities is clearly stated in the Principles, 284
such that the right to sue will inhere in a community's status as
intended beneficiary.
2. Express Negation Clauses
As noted in Part II, several roadblocks exist for plaintiffs
pursuing claims under the third-party-beneficiary theory.285 The
New York rule is that an express negation clause controls,286 and
the majority of project finance loan documents most likely will
include one. Halliburton indicates that a future court may find
alternative ways of dealing with a negation clause.287 For example,
a court may focus on the Principles' overwhelming intent to
benefit project-affected communities to bypass the negation
clause.288
The rules of contract interpretation described in Part II may
also provide assistance to project-affected plaintiffs.289 The
presumption in favor of negotiated terms, rather than standard
or boilerplate terms is helpful. 290 Although every contract might
contain a negation clause, the inclusion of the Principles in loan
documentation is often heavily negotiated. Indeed, the EPFIs'
explicit statement that they will not lend to borrowers that do not
adhere to the Principles suggests that the intent to benefit third
parties prevails over a negation clause. Second, the prohibition
read the distinction between incidental and intended beneficiaries out of the federal
common law of contracts.").
284. See generally THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES, supra note 2.
285. See supra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing barriers for
plaintiffs bringing an action under the third-party-beneficiary theory).
286. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing the New York rule
regarding express negation clauses).
287. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of the
express negation clause in Halliburton).
288. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text (discussing the treatment of
the express negation clause in Prouty).
289. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text (discussing rules of contract
interpretation).
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on finding superfluous terms in a contract291 could allow a court
to find in favor of plaintiffs. To read a negation clause as
controlling would defeat the purpose of the Principles to benefit
project-affected communities, rendering the Principles
superfluous. Thus, a court could find that the Principles
supersede the negation clause.
3. Jurisdictional Issues
Because many projects governed by the Principles will take
place outside of the United States, plaintiffs may face
jurisdictional barriers. Fortunately, many project finance
contracts are governed by New York law, or the laws of another
US state.292 Thus a breach-of-contract claim would place the
lawsuit squarely in US court.
4. Practical Issues
For a project-affected community in a developing nation, to
bring a lawsuit in US court would be no small feat. Risk-taking
lawyers willing to represent communities against borrowers may
be able to address this difficulty. Another barrier is the lack of
disclosure and transparency about EPFIs and the projects they
fund.29 3 Due to confidentiality issues on the part of EPFIs, it may
be difficult for the local community to discover the actual terms
of a loan agreement.294 Therefore, seeking enforcement of those
terms would be challenging.
CONCLUSION
The Principles' express purpose is to create sustainable
practices in project finance. Because of the lack of an adequate
enforcement mechanism, however, the Principles often seem to
exist only on paper. Given the potential for large-scale social and
environmental destruction, greater accountability is required.
Absent greater accountability, borrowers and EPFIs obtain a dual
291. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the rules of contract
interpretation as to superfluous terms).
292. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the governing law
that applies in most project finance contracts).
293. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing access to information).
294. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing access to information).
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windfall: by touting the Principles, they gain a reputation for
sustainable practices while remaining noncompliant, and they
obtain significant financial benefits from projects that may harm
the local community and ecosystem. This outcome is antithetical
to the Principles-borrowers should not be able to benefit from
the exploitation of project-affected communities.
Under a third-party-beneficiary theory in US contract law,
project-affected communities would be able to hold EPFIs and
borrowers accountable for failing to perform their promises
under the Principles. Project-affected communities have the
greatest stake in a project's compliance because they have the
most to lose-their own social and environmental well-being.
Recognition of a third-party-beneficiary right in project-affected
communities would place enforcement power in the hands of the
parties most interested in compliance. Thus, in the interest of
efficiency, and of justice, courts should recognize project-affected
communities as third-party-beneficiaries of contracts that include
the Principles.
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